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ENFORCING THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST
RELATIONSHIP AFTER MITCHELL *
Nell Jessup Newton**
I. THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP: AN UNCERTAIN DOCTRINE
OF INDIAN LAW
The legislative,' judicial,2 and executive branches3 of the government
have acknowledged Indian tribes' special relationship to the federal gov-
ernment. Borrowing concepts from trust law, courts have described this
relationship most eloquently: the relationship is like "that of a ward to his
guardian,"4 imposing "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and
trust,"5 that should "be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards."6
For six decades courts invoked this relationship, primarily, however, as the
source of federal "plenary" power to regulate exclusively a wide spectrum
of Indian affairs-from the management of Indian land and resources,7 to
* On June 7, 1982, the Supreme Court granted petition for certiorari in Mitchell v.
United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. C1. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3963 (U.S. June 7,
1982) (No. 81-1748).
•* Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America School of Law; B.A., 1973,
University of California (Berkeley); J.D., 1976, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
1. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (Supp. III 1979);
Indian Health Care Improvement Act, § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976); 25 U.S.C. § 175
(1976) (United States Attorney shall represent Indians in lawsuits).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 414-15 (1980) (guardianship
limits government power to dispose of Indian land); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552
(1974) ("special relationship"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)
(guardian-ward relationship) (Marshall, C.J.).
3. "[Tlhe special relationship between the Indian tribes and the Federal government
continues to carry immense moral and legal force." Special Message to the Congress on
Indian Affairs, 213 Pub. Papers of Richard Nixon 564, 566 (July 8, 1970). "[Y]ou will per-
ceive . . . the fatherly care the United States intend to take of the Indians." President
George Washington, quoted in Seneca Nation v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 917, 924 (1965)
(emphasis omitted). See also letter from Leo M. Krulitz, Solicitor, United States Department
of the Interior to James W. Moorman, Assistant United States Attorney General (Nov. 21,
1978) (affirming the Carter Administration's view of the relationship), reprinted in Brief for
Respondent, Appendix, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
4. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
5. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
6. Id
7. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (power to dispose of Indian land
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the application of federal criminal laws to tribal members on reservations,8
and even to the dissolution of Indian tribes' governing structures. 9
During the last twenty years, Indian tribes have sought to establish that
this right of exclusive federal regulatory power gives rise to concomitant
fiduciary duties. In response to the essential fairness of this claim, courts
awarded equitable relief, and even money damages, to tribes suing the
federal government for breach of trust in a handful of cases' ° before
as guardian of the tribe); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (power to lease
Indian land as guardian).
8. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding constitutionality of the
Major Crimes Act as an exercise of congressional guardianship power).
9. See Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, § 46, 31 Stat. 861, 872 (Creek Nation tribal govern-
ment to cease as of March 4, 1906, unless extended by Congress); S.J. Res. 7, 34 Stat. 822
(1906) (extending tribal government until all tribal property distributed). See generally
Board of Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 716 (1942).
10. This handful of cases becomes larger when two categories are added. The first cate-
gory includes claims brought under special jurisdictional acts during the 83 years Indian
tribes were explicitly barred from suing when the government waived its sovereign immu-
nity for damage claims by creating the Court of Claims. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12
Stat. 765, 767 (for a discussion of this statute and a criticism of the Indian law bar's ready
acquiescence to and broad interpretation of the Act, see Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Suedfor
Its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States P. Mitchell, 26 S.D.L. REV. 447, 461-62 n.108
(1981)). To sue, tribes had to petition Congress for a statute waiving sovereign immunity and
vesting the Court of Claims with jurisdiction. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States,
101 Ct. Cl. 10 (1944) (construing Act of Sept. 3, 1935, ch. 839, 49 Stat. 1085, as amendedby,
Act of Apr. 8, 1938, ch. 120, 52 Stat. 208). Often these claims involved breach of trust,
especially mismanagement of tribal trust funds. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe, 101 Ct. Cl. at 10.
Some of these cases are gold mines of favorable language regarding the government's trust
responsibilities. See, e.g., supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. Nevertheless they are
doubtful precedents, for the jurisdictional acts have been regarded as creating claims in and
of themselves in recent years. See United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48,
49 (1951). For example, in Menominee Tribe, the statute permitted the court to adjudicate
claims based on treaty, statute or agreement or arising from mismanagement of property or
money. Act of Sept. 3, 1935, ch. 839, § 1, 49 Stat. 1085, 1085. It also instructed the court to
apply to the government the same standards applicable to a private trustee. Id § 3. The
Menominee Tribe successfully pressed several breach of trust claims under this statute. See,
e.g., Menominee Tribe v, United States, 67 F. Supp. 972 (1946) (mismanagement of trust
funds); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 290 (1951) (mismanagement of tim-
ber). See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 832 (1951) (all cases settled for
$8.5 million). Other statutes were less explicit. Compare, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 286, 295 (1942) ("all legal and equitable claims") with United States v.
Blackfeather, 155 U.S. 180, 195 (1894) (to recover money wrongfully diverted from tribal
fund) and Sioux Tribe v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 312 (Ct. Cl. 1946) (to settle ownership of
stock & funds held in trust). See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
373-78 (1942 & photo reprint).
The second category comprises claims brought under the Indian Claims Commission Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976). The Claims
Commission Act set up a tribunal to adjudicate claims accruing before 1946 with appellate
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims. These claims included breach of trust claims, usually
brought as accounting claims. See 25 U.S.C. § 70(a) (1976). See generally UNITED STATES
[Vol; 31:635
Federal-Indian Trust
1980.11 Nevertheless, the exact source of this special relationship remains
uncertain. Ownership of Indian land, 2 the helplessness of Indian tribes in
the face of a superior culture, 3 higher law, 4 the entire course of dealings
INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 8 (1978). Again, the decided cases often con-
tain glowing language about the trust relationship, but must be regarded cautiously as prece-
dent. See, e.g., Northern Paiute Nation v. United States, 634 F.2d 594, 605-06 (Ct. Cl. 1980)
(breach of fair and honorable dealings by abandoning tribal sawmill); Ottawa Tribe v.
United States, 166 Ct. Cl. 373, 379, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964) (application of private
trust law principles to hold U.S. liable for conflict of interest of agent). These breach of trust
decisions have also been regarded as exercises of the Commission's jurisdiction to decide
"moral" rather than "legal" claims. See, e.g., Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 776, 781 (Ct. Cl. 1956). Cf. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.
535, 540 & n.2 (1980). See also Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Respon-
sibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1214 n.8 (1975).
These pre-1946 Indian Claims Commission cases and special jurisdictional act cases are
often cited indiscriminately by courts, especially as authority for the existence of a trust
relationship. See., e.g., Eric v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev.,
464 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Alaska 1978) (reliance on special act case; held U.S. had a trust duty
to Alaskan natives); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238,
1243, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (reliance on special act cases). Because of the doubtful prece-
dential value of these special act cases, this article will focus on cases brought under tradi-
tional jurisdictional statutes.
11. See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979) (injunctive relief
awarded tribe because removing tribal president's brother from position as superintendent
of tribe's BIA office violated specific statute, "letter and spirit of internal guidelines" and
"distinctive obligation of trust"); White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir, 1978) (declara-
tory relief that trust relationship requires government to pay medical costs for indigent In-
dian); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 479 F. Supp. 536 (D.N.M. 1979)
(injunctive and declaratory relief awarded tribe for mismanagement of oil and gas leases);
Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (equitable relief and damages
awarded for breach of trust in terminating rancheria unlawfully); Duncan v. Andrus, 517 F.
Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (equitable relief; same facts as Smith); Manchester Band of Pomo
Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (damages and equitable relief
for mismanagement of trust funds); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252
(D.D.C. 1973) (equitable relief; duty to avoid conflicts of interest in preserving water for
tribal lake); Duncan v. United States, 597 F.2d 1337 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (damages awarded for
breach of trust in terminating rancheria unlawfully), vacated and remanded, 446 U.S. 903
(1980), decision on remand, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. CI. 1981),pet.for cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3785
(U.S. Mar. 30, 1982) (No. 81-1747); Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639
(Ct. Cl. 1977) (damages awarded for breach of trust in sale of right-of-way for less than fair
market value); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(order partially disposing of subordinate legal issues; trial judge to apply trust principles in
determining whether Secretary of Interior breached trust in mismanaging trust funds).
12. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Union Pac. R.R., 253 U.S. 442, 446 (1920); United States v.
Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1873); United States v. Leslie 167 F. 670 (D.S.D. 1909).
13. Eg., DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Monson v. Simonson,
231 U.S. 341, 345 (19.13); Oneida Tribe v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 487, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 946 (1964).
14. See United States v. Douglas, 190 F. 482, 490 (8th Cir. 1911).
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between the government and Indian tribes,' 5 treaties, 16 and "hundreds of
cases and. . . a bulging volume of the U.S. Code"' 7 have all been cited as
the source.
Pressed by the necessity of determining whether a breach of trust has in
fact occurred, courts have defined somewhat more specifically the scope of
the federal government's fiduciary duties by looking to treaties, 18 stat-
utes, 9 the federal common law of trusts (heavily influenced by the Restate-
ment of Trusts),2 ° and a combination of these sources for guidance.
Furthermore, when relying on statutes and treaties as the source of en-
forceable fiduciary duties, courts have read them broadly,2' often applying
rules of construction favoring Indian tribes.22 In the 1970's particularly,
15. E.g., Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 369 (1968); United States v. Semi-
nole Nation, 299 U.S. 417 (1937); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 7 INDIAN L. REP. (AM.
INDIAN LAW TRAINING PROGRAM) 5093 (Ct. Cl. Aug. 14, 1980).
16. See cases cited infra note 18.
17. White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978).
18. Eg., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Yankton Sioux Tribe v.
United States, 623 F.2d 159 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 7 INDIAN L.
REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW TRAINING PROGRAM) 5093 (Ct. Cl. Aug. 14, 1980); Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 451 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370
(lst Cir. 1975) (Nonintercourse Act creates a trust relationship to protect Indian land);
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979) (Indian Reorganization Act);
Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 485 F.2d 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (construing 25 U.S.C.
§ 406(a) to permit deduction of expenses of administering timber reserves; therefore no
breach of trust).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (1959). United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391
(1973) (the scope of fiduciary duties is a matter of federal common law); Manchester Band
of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (applying Restatement).
21. See, e.g., Duncan v. Andrus, 517 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (established law
requires legislation to be interpreted for the benefit of Indians). Cf. Joint Tribal Council of
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975) (Nonintercourse Act
imposes a fiduciary duty on United States to protect Indian tribal lands).
22. From the beginning courts have employed liberal rules of construction to treaties
affecting Indian tribes. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552-55, 582
(1832) (interpretation in light of Indian understanding); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363,
367 (1930) ("Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless
people who are wards of the nation"); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942) (state
licensing of fishing rights preempted by treaty). Similarly, statutes ratifying treaties or agree-
ments also have been liberally construed, "doubtful expressions. . . resolved in favor of a
weak and defenseless people." Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975) (collect-
ing cases). A liberal rule also has been applied when statutory language is ambiguous. See,
e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (construing Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub.
L. No. 280, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, 589) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976 & Supp III
1979)); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7, (1956) (tax exemption). Compare Washington
v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 484 (1979)
(Stewart, J.) with 439 U.S. at 507 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). But cf. Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586 (1977) (ascertainable congressional intent controls
[Vol. 31:635
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the courts handed down many favorable decisions. For example, courts
have held the government liable for mismanagement of property, 23 or-
dered the government to manage trust funds prudently, 24 and imposed du-
ties on the government to preserve water for a tribal lake.25 Nevertheless,
before 1980 the scope of the government's fiduciary duties remained un-
certain as the trust relationship doctrine continued its maturation. In 1980
that process took a decisive turn in United States v. Mitchell.26 To under-
stand this new direction, the prerequisites for suing to enforce the trust
relationship must be understood.
To sue the government for breach of trust, a tribe must satisfy three
major threshold requirements: bring its claim in a competent court, one
statutorily vested with subject matter jurisdiction; escape the doctrine of
sovereign immunity by establishing the government's consent to be sued;
and, finally, assert a claim, a federally recognized right entitling it to the
relief requested. 7
The first requirement, subject matter jurisdiction, has been easily satis-
fied. Tribes seeking money damages for breach of trust have invoked the
Tucker Act,2 empowering the Court of Claims2 9 (and the district courts in
over understanding of Indians when statute is ambiguous). The trust responsibility has usu-
ally been cited as the source of the liberal rules. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236
(1973).
23. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 479 F. Supp. 536 (D.N.M. 1979) (oil
& gas leases); Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (helium lease).
24. E.g., Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
25. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
26. 445 U.S. 535 (1980), decision on remand, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3963 (U.S. June 7, 1982) (No. 81-1748).
27. The first and third requirements often coincide in Indian breach of trust claims, at
least when the statutes discussed below are invoked as bases for jurisdiction. For instance, a
court may determine federal question jurisdiction is not present because the plaintiff has not
stated a claim based on federal law. See., e.g., Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 917 n.2 (1st Cir.
1979) (no jurisdiction because no claim). Nevertheless, the two concepts are analytically
distinct. See, e.g., Duncan v. Andrus, 517 F. Supp. 1, 1-2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (claim for
equitable relief retained; claim for money damages transferred to the Court of Claims). See
also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified, as amended, in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Effective October 1, 1982, the Federal
Courts Improvement Act will make some radical changes in Courts of Claims structure, by
merging the present Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals into a new
court of appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and by creating
an Article I trial court, the United States Claims Court, to handle the present trial jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Claims. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
§§ 101, 105, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 25-28 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 41, 171-77). This statute will speed up the resolution of Indian claims and also
19821
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cases involving less than $10,000)30 to hear a variety of claims against the
government, including claims "founded ...upon ...any Act of Con-
gress." 31 Since many statutes refer directly32 or indirectly3 3 to a trust rela-
tionship, the Court of Claims generally has invoked this provision as the
basis for its jurisdiction.34 In the federal district courts, tribes usually have
invoked general federal question jurisdiction 35 or the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA)36 as the jurisdictional bases of claims for declaratory 37
provide uniformity in the law by requiring many Tucker Act claims to be appealed to the
Federal Circuit Court. 1d. at §§ 127, 128. It does not affect any of the substantive issues
discussed in this paper. For the legislative history see S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 11.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976). The Federal Courts Improvement Act provides that
concurrent Tucker Act cases based on an act of Congress will still be presented to the re-
gional courts of appeal instead of the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal
Court Improvement Act of 1982, §§ 127-128. See general S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 30.
31. "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress
... 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). A treaty has been held to be an Act of Congress for pur-
poses of Tucker Act jurisdiction. Hebah v. United States, 428 F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl. 1970). For a
history of the Tucker Act, see Hughes, supra note 10, at 451-54; Orme, Tucker Act Jurisdic-
tion Over Breach of Trust Claims, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 855-60. The Court of Claims may
only award equitable relief as an adjunct to its primary jurisdiction to award money dam-
ages. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557 (1962); Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. United
States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 487 (1966) (tribe may only sue for an accounting of trust funds after it
has demonstrated government has violated a statutory duty requiring an accounting to as-
sess damages).
32. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 463(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (title to lands acquired for Umatilla
reservation to be held "in trust" by the United States); id § 348 (allotted land to be held "in
trust for the sole use and benefit" of the Indian allottee).
33. Eg., 25 U.S.C. § 155 (1976) (miscellaneous revenues derived from Indian reserva-
tions to be deposited in the Treasury "for expenditure, in the discretion of the Secretary of
the Interior, for the benefit of the Indian tribes"); id § 158 (Secretary empowered to invest
payments for land at a minimum 5% interest).
34. See, e.g., Quinault Allottees Ass'n v. United States, 485 F.2d 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364, 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 391 (1973). But cf Fields v. United States, 423 F.2d 380,
383-84 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (no Tucker Act jurisdiction over claim by alleged heir to share in oil
and gas proceeds; state courts vested with exclusive jurisdiction over heirship matters); Gila
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 776 (Ct. Cl. 1956)
(claim of mismanagement filed in Court of Claims suspended pending the Indian Claims
Commission's determination of whether its jurisdiction encompassed wrongs continuing af-
ter 1946). Examples of federal district courts invoking concurrent Tucker Act jurisdiction to
litigate breach of trust claims are rare, because of the $10,000 limit on money damages. See,
e.g., Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Manchester Band of
Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (general federal questions), 28 U.S.C.
1362 (1976) (federal questions brought by Indian tribal plaintiffs).
36. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
37. The Declaratory Judgment Act gives federal courts the power to issue declaratory
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and injunctive relief against agencies of the federal government.38 Except
when tribes have attempted to avoid the Court of Claims by masking a
money claim as one for equitable relief,39 federal district courts have ac-
cepted jurisdiction willingly over breach of trust claims.4"
judgments in cases otherwise "within [their] jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). Thus, the Act itself is not a basis for federal court jurisdiction. "Congress
enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts, but did not extend their juris-
diction." Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).
38. See, e.g., White v. Matthews, 420 F. Supp. 882 (D.S.D. 1976), ad sub nom. White
v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978) (§ 1331); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me. 1975) (§§ 1331, 2201, & APA), a 9'd, 528 F.2d 370
(1st Cir. 1975); Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973) (§ 1331 & APA);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 F.2d 1116, 1119, 1136 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 995 (1979) (§ 1362) (jurisdiction to seek injunction against United States to restrain
diversion of tribal water rights). Another basis of jurisdiction successfully invoked by Indian
tribes is the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). See, e.g., Manchester Band
of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (§§ 1361, 1362, &
APA). A final basis of federal court jurisdiction is a provision giving the federal district
courts jurisdiction over suits "involving the right of any person, in whole or in part of Indian
blood or descent," to an allotment of land. 25 U.S.C. § 345 (1976). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1353
(1976), a jurisdictional recodification of § 345 (construed in Scholder v . United States, 428
F.2d 1123, 1126 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) (judicial focus has been on
§ 345)). In the cases coming within this narrow definition and involving an asserted breach
of trust, Indian claimants have been successful in obtaining both specific relief and money
damages. See, e.g., Scholder, 428 F.2d at 1126 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1970) (section 345 need not be
limited to granting of allotment in first instance, but can be invoked to challenge govern-
mental actions having the effect of putting a lien on allotted land). One court has held that
since the government policy of allotting Indian land has been abandoned, a successful plain-
tiff may only receive money damages. Antoine v. United States, 637 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir.
1981). But see Vicenti v. United States, 470 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 1057 (1973) (section 345 only permits declaratory relief because it does not also waive
sovereign immunity).
39. See, e.g., Alamo Navajo School Bd. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1981). Such
cases can be transferred to the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(c) (1976). See, e.g., Hoopa
Valley Tribe v. United States, 596 F.2d 435 (Ct. Cl. 1979). See also Cape Fox Corp. v.
United States, 456 F. Supp. 784, 791-98 (D. Alaska 1978) (extensive discussion of district
court jurisdiction), modified, 646 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1981).
40. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 F.2d 1116, 1136 (10th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979) (Indian federal question jurisdiction over misman-
agement of water rights; obligation of federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction). See also
supranotes 35-37. Cf. Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 917 n.2 (1st Cir. 1979) (no jurisdiction
over claim by individual Indians for breach of trust because individuals are not beneficiaries
of the Nonintercourse Act). District courts may sometimes award money damages when
exercising jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, or § 345. See supra notes 30 & 38 and accom-
panying text. When the breach of trust can be characterized as a tort, an aggrieved person or
tribe could also invoke the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for jurisdiction and as an
explicit consent to be sued in the federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). See, e.g.,
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150 (1972) (jurisdiction under FTCA,
but no liability because no duty to terminated tribe). The FTCA has not been widely used,
however, probably because of the need to prove negligence, the exemption for discretionary
duties, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) even when discretion has been abused, and the need to file an
1982]
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The second requirement, a statutory consent to be sued,41 has posed no
real problem, especially after Congress amended the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act in 1976, explicitly waiving sovereign immunity for claims based
on the APA.42 Even before the amendment, however, many district courts
had readily found consent to be sued in the APA4 3 and various other stat-
utes,' when they considered the question at all.45 The Court of Claims
also found consent to be sued by viewing the same Tucker Act provision
granting jurisdiction for claims based on statutes to be a waiver of immu-
nity for such claims.46
The final requirement, a claim upon which relief can be granted, has
also been easily met, but based on uncertain analysis. In recent breach of
trust claims, courts have turned most often to statutes and regulations, but
sometimes to treaties and even the federal common law, as a basis for tri-
bal claims for equitable remedies and money damages. 7
administrative claim before suing. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). See generally Note, A Remedyfor a
Breach of the Government-Indian Trust Duties, I N.M.L. REV. 320, 326-28 (1971). In a
proper case a district court can, of course, award both money damages and equitable relief.
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (concurrent Tucker
Act and federal question jurisdiction).
41. See, e.g., Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473, 475-76 (1906) (sovereign immunity
barred equitable relief for breach of trust); National Indian Youth Council v. Bruce, 485
F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir. 1973) (28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction; no waiver of sovereign immu-
nity); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555, 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1959) (28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 jurisdiction; trust relationship alone cannot waive sovereign immunity). See generally
14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654
(1976 & Supp. 1981).
42. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1976)).
43. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D.D.C.
1973); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971). Contra, e.g., Tewa Tesuque v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974).
44. See, e.g., Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973) (28 U.S.C. § 1331
& APA); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 38 (N.D. Cal.
1973) (28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1362 & APA).
45. For a contrast to the perfunctory treatment of sovereign immunity in the cases cited
in supra notes 43-44 and an analysis of the exceptions to the doctrine when agents of the
United States are sued, see Scholder v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1970) (constru-
ing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1353, 1361, 1362 (1976)).
46. See Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300, 1303 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (collecting cases),
rev'd, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). A tribe may sue only agents of the federal government, not
Congress itself. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (trust
relationship not enforceable against Congress).
47. See, e.g., Duncan v. Andrus, 517 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (statute); Jicarilla
Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 479 F. Supp. 536, 540, 547, 550 (D.N.M. 1972) (regu-
lations); Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1375 (D.D.C. 1973) (common law);
Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 485 F.2d 1391, 1400-01, (Ct. Cl. 1973) (treaty &
statute).
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Thus, tribes have had little difficulty in gaining access to courts to raise
trust claims.48 Although few in number, these decisions have sparked a
great deal of interest.49 In his influential Handbook of Federal Indian Law
published in 1946, Felix Cohen devoted little attention to the trust rela-
tionship;5" in contrast, since the 1970's, the trust relationship has become a
major doctrine of Indian law, with its enforceability virtually taken for
granted. For example, in Mitchell v. United States,5 the Court of Claims
held that a claim for money damages against the government for misman-
agement of land and its valuable timber resources based on a General Al-
lotment Act provision stating that certain land was to be "held in trust" for
the Indian owners, was "founded . . .upon . . . any Act of Congress"52
within the meaning of the Tucker Act. Accordingly, the court had jurisdic-
tion, sovereign immunity from money damages was waived, and a cause of
action asserted. 3
In reversing Mitchell, the Supreme Court called for a halt to the some-
what casual attitude of the Court of Claims toward consent to be sued and
the establishment of a cause of action for money damages.54 The Court
first held that although the Tucker Act grants subject matter jurisdiction
for money damages, it does not waive sovereign immunity for a claim
based on a statute. Waiver must be found independently, and while it may
be found in a statute creating a cause of action, that statute must specifi-
cally impose a duty on the federal government and mandate compensation
for breach of that duty. Then, narrowly construing the Allotment Act pro-
vision putting the tribal land in trust, the Supreme Court concluded that
the statute created only a limited trust relationship to prevent alienation or
taxation of the land and did not explicitly impose a duty on the United
States to manage the timber properly. Since there was no statutory duty,
48. Of course, they have not always been successful on the merits. See, e.g., United
States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973) (U.S. acted reasonably in failing to challenge inheri-
tance tax imposed on Indian allottee); Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(trust relationship does not mandate return of aboriginal lands wrongfully taken); Quinault
Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 485 F.2d 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (no violation of treaty, contract
or fiduciary duties).
49. See, e.g., D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 204-52 (1979); Chambers, supra note 10. See generally AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES & THE FED-
ERAL-INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP (1976).
50. Compare F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 169-76 with HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 220-28 (1982 ed.).
51. 591 F.2d 1300 (Ct. Cl. 1979), rev'd, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
52. See supra note 31.
53. See infra notes 130-51 and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
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the Court did not reach the question whether Congress also intended the
Act to waive sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the claimants were fore-
closed from bringing suit for money damages.
55
The Court's opinion has implications reaching far beyond issues of
waiver of sovereign immunity. First, Mitchell appears to require the statute
relied on in the Court of Claims to be read narrowly from the standpoint
of whether the United States has any duties. Thus, claimants can no longer
depend on courts to construe general statutes liberally as creating a trust
relationship that by its own accord imposes broad fiduciary duties on the
government. Second, reading Mitchell as signaling a restriction in Court of
Claims jurisdiction, tribes may be forced to bring claims for equitable rem-
edies and to abandon efforts to bring claims based on statutes not specifi-
cally waiving sovereign immunity for money damages. Third, Mitchell
also has implications for district court suits seeking equitable relief. In two
recent cases in the District of Columbia Circuit, courts have had occasion
to interpret the Supreme Court's requirement that statutes describe explic-
itly the duties imposed on the federal government. Although the Mitchell
Court emphasized explicitness in the duty imposed only when discussing
the topic of sovereign immunity, the District of Columbia Circuit has re-
quired the same standard of statutory explicitness be used to delineate the
nature and scope of any alleged trust obligation of the federal govern-
ment.56 If other federal courts concur, tribal breach of trust claims in dis-
trict courts, too, may be curtailed. Although this trend would have the
salutory effect of bringing some order to an unsatisfactorily amorphous
area of law,57 it may leave Indian tribes in the unhappy position they were
in during the six decades before the trust law victories: the government
manages most of their assets and resources, often without explicit statutory
authorization, yet cannot be held strictly accountable for mismanagement,
either through legal or equitable remedies.
The Mitchell decision has been criticized appropriately as breaking with
precedent on both Court of Claims jurisdiction and Indian trust law.58 As-
55. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
56. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PRO-
GRAM) 3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611-13
(D.C.Cir. 1981). For an analysis of these cases, see infra notes 242-76 and accompanying
text.
57. For an argument in favor of keeping the trust relationship undefined, see AMERI-
CAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 95TH CONG, IST SESS., FINAL REPORT 132-33
(Comm. Print 1977).
58. Hughes, supra note 10. See also Note, Indian Breach of Trust Suits,- Partial Justice in
the Court of the Conqueror, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 502 (1981); Note, Whom Can Indians Trust
After Mitchell?, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 179 (1981).
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suming this break with tradition was intentional, however, this article will
focus on Mitchell's effects on breach of trust litigation in the Court of
Claims and the federal district courts. To provide an understanding of the
state of the law at the time Mitchell was decided, the article begins with a
discussion of the influential breach of trust cases decided before Mitchell.59
Next, Justice Marshall's analysis in the majority opinion will be examined
in fuller detail.60 The article will then turn to an analysis of Mitchell's ef-
fects. Focusing on Tucker Act claims, a two-pronged analysis will be em-
ployed. First, the previous breach of trust cases based on the Tucker Act
will be reexamined to ascertain whether any of these cases could meet the
stricter tests enunciated in Mitchell. Second, three Tucker Act cases de-
cided by the Court of Claims after Mitchell will be analyzed: one attempt-
ing to avoid Mitchell and two others holding that more specific statutes
meet the requirement of Mitchell.6 Focusing next on claims for equitable
relief, decisions relying on Mitchell will be analyzed and contrasted with
similar claims made before Mitchell.62 Finally, conclusions will be drawn
from this analysis regarding the broader implications for Indian law and
policy that may flow from Mitchell.
II. LITIGATING THE SCOPE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES BEFORE MITCHELL
Whether by fiat, tribal choice, or inertia, the federal government holds
many Indian tribal funds and most Indian land in trust, exercising perva-
sive authority over almost every aspect of property management.63 The
value of this property is significant. Indian tribes earned $197 million from
development of mineral resources in fiscal 1980, most of it from oil and
gas.' In addition, tribes received $117 million for forestry rights and $55
million for grazing and other surface rights.65 Not surprisingly, the earliest
decisions holding the government liable for breach of trust resulted from
claims alleging mismanagement of resources and money. For instance, the
government not only failed to invest tribal trust funds, but often failed to
pay any interest on funds held in the United States Treasury on the ground
59. See infra notes 63-111 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 152-240 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 242-76 and accompanying text.
63. For a review of differing views of the murky origins of the trust relationship, see
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES
AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP; INCLUDING TREATY REVIEW 47-53 (1976).
64. COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES,
FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES 116 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as the LINOWES REPORT].
65. Id at 6.
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that neither was required by statute.66 In Manchester Band ofPomo Indians
v. United States,67 a California district court exercising concurrent Tucker
Act jurisdiction blazed a new trail by holding the government liable for
mismanagement of tribal trust funds. In an analysis that has become a
model for later decisions, Judge Renfrew first accepted the existence of a
trust relationship as "unquestioned," relying on previous court decisions
and federal statutes pertaining to Indian funds.68 Next, reading those stat-
utes liberally "to the benefit of the Indians, ' 69 he determined that the laws
required Indian funds to earn at least four percent interest and authorized
higher-yielding investments. Judge Renfrew turned to common law to de-
termine the fiduciary duties imposed on the government, reasoning that
the government should be held to the same standards as private trustees.7"
Finally, applying these standards the court held the government liable for
failing to invest the tribe's money.7 The Court of Claims soon followed
suit in a broadly written opinion stating that the United States, by the very
act of keeping Indian money in the Treasury, "in effect impose[d] trust
status on the Indian funds," even when the statutes authorizing deposit of
Indian money in the Treasury did not use the word "trust."72 The Court
then directed the trial judge to apply private trust law standards to meas-
ure the government's management of the funds at issue."
A beneficial effect of these two cases is that Indian tribal funds no longer
languish in the Treasury earning low rates of interest, or none at all. Per-
haps because the evidence of mismanagement was so strong, however,
both courts were relatively cavalier in determining they had jurisdiction74
66. See generally Note, Indian Tribal Trust Funds, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 519 (1975).
67. 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
68. Id at 1243.
69. Id (quoting Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C.
1973)).
70. 363 F. Supp. at 1245.
71. Id at 1247.
72. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390, 1392 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
73. Id at 1395. The Court found the case in a posture inappropriate for summary judg-
ment, but invoked Court of Claims Rule 101(e) to dispose partially of some of the subsidiary
issues, primarily the scope of the Secretary's fiduciary duties. Id at 1394-95. But cjf United
States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (no duty to invest trust funds
absent statute, treaty, contract, or constitutional provision). For a comparison of these two
cases, see infra note 167.
74. In Manchester Band, the court invoked concurrent Tucker Act jurisdiction for the
money damages claim without any explanation. In addition, the court invoked various bases
ofjurisdiction for equitable relief, including the APA, but did not discuss sovereign immu-
nity from suit. 363 F. Supp. at 1242-43. In Cheyenne-Arapaho, the Court of Claims asserted
that its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1505 "is broad enough to cover the types of claims
made here." 512 F.2d at 1392.
[Vol. 31:635
Federal-Indian Trust
and, more important in applying private trust law to the government in a
case "founded. . .upon. . . any Act of Congress" within the meaning of
the Tucker Act."
Early cases regarding mismanagement of trust property also presented
appealing facts. In Navajo Tribe v. United States,76 the Court of Claims
analogized to private trust law in holding the government liable for ar-
ranging an assignment of a helium lease it supervised for the tribe for a
nominal consideration when the assignor had announced its intention to
surrender the lease to the tribe. (According to the court the Bureau of
Mines was eager to develop a helium plant because of war-time need and
feared that turning the lease over to the tribe and then obtaining the lease
from the tribe would result in "complications.")77 Reasoning that the gov-
ernment's supervision of oil and gas leases on tribal property created at the
very least a "special duty of care regarding the property,' ' 78 the court lik-
ened the situation to "that of a fiduciary who learns of an opportunity,
prevents the beneficiary from getting it, and seizes it for himself. ' 79 Al-
though stressing the United States might not be a trustee "in the technical
sense," 80 the court took a broad view of both the source and the scope of
the government's duties. The same approach was characteristic of later
Court of Claims decisions. In Coast Indian Community v. United States,"'
the court held the government liable for breach of trust in granting a
county a right of way worth $57,000 over Indian land for only $2,500. The
source of the duty was much clearer in this case, because a statute required
the Secretary of the Interior to pay "such compensation as [he] shall deter-
mine to be just."82 Nevertheless, the court never referred to that provision,
instead relying on the trust status of the land and a provision authorizing
the Secretary to grant rights of way by exercising "the Government's au-
thority as guardian or trustee over Indian property."8 " The court then re-
ferred to common law in measuring the government's liability.84
Two 1973 decisions of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia demonstrate the courts' receptiveness to breach of trust claims
75. Compare Manchester Band of Poro Indians, 363 F. Supp. at 1245-46 with Cheyenne-
Arapaho, 512 F.2d at 1394 (relying on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (1959)).
76. 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
77. Id at 323.
78. Id at 322.
79. Id at 324.
80. Id at 322.
81. 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
82. 25 U.S.C. § 325 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
83. 550 F.2d at 652.
84. Id at 653 & n.43.
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concerning Indian land. In Edwardsen v. Morton,85 Judge Gasch held that
Alaskan Natives had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against
federal officers who permitted oil companies to trespass on Native lands in
the period before the Settlement Act extinguished Native title.8 6 As to the
source and scope of the trust relationship, the court relied on previous
court decisions87 including dicta in one case stating that the government
has a duty to protect Indian land from third party intrusions. 8 As a result
of this decision, the United States agreed to sue the trespassers on behalf of
the Natives.89 A second decision that year, Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Morton,90 reached the merits of a claim, brought under the Administrative
Procedure Act, alleging that the Secretary of the Interior violated his duty
to the tribe by sacrificing the tribal interest in keeping Pyramid Lake full in
order to protect the Bureau of Reclamation's interest in diverting water
from the lake as part of an irrigation project. (The problem of divided
loyalty is a continuing source of concern for Indian tribes because the Sec-
retary of the Interior oversees the Bureau of Indian Affairs as well as such
traditional opponents of Indian interests as the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, the Forest Service, and the Bureau of Reclamation.)9' In holding the
Secretary's action to be arbitrary, Judge Gesell relied on the trust relation-
ship. Citing case law and the "detailed statutory scheme for Indian affairs
set forth in Title 25 of the United States Code" as sources of this relation-
ship,92 the court ordered the Secretary to submit new regulations consis-
tent with his duty to do the utmost to preserve water for the lake.9 3
Significantly, in Pyramid Lake no statute or treaty required the Secre-
tary of the Interior to do what the court ordered. As one commentator has
stated:
The diversions violated no specific treaty or statutory provision,
85. 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973).
86. Id at 1378-79.
87. Id at 1367 (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942);
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. 1 (1831); Navaho Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Territory of
Alaska v. Annette Island Packing Co., 289 F. 671 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 708
(1923)).
88. Id at 1375 (quoting Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279
(1955)).
89. The tribe lost on the merits. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 612 F.2d
1132 (9th Cir. 1980) (claims extinguished by Native Claims Settlement Act).
90. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
91. See generally Chambers & Price, Regulating Sovereignty" Secretarial Discretion and
the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061 (1974).
92. 354 F. Supp. at 256 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 174, 476 (1976)).
93. 354 F. Supp. at 258.
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but the court held the operation of the project violated the gov-
ernment's trust responsibility to the tribe. The case, therefore, im-
poses a duty of loyalty on federal officials, and suggests that when
actions or projects of federal agencies conffict with the trust re-
sponsibility to Indians, the non-Indian federal activity should be
operated so as to avoid interference with Indian trust property.
94
Immediately before Mitchell was decided, this receptiveness to claims
based on the trust relationship had begun to extend beyond claims of land
and money mismanagement. In White v. Califano,95 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued a declaratory judgment that
the trust relationship required the government to pay the hospital costs of
an indigent Sioux committed to a state hospital by a tribal court. Again the
facts were appealing--the woman needed hospitalization, the tribe had no
facilities, and both the state and the federal government had refused to
pay. Still, no statute or regulation imposed such a duty; in fact the Indian
Health Service had determined that since Indians are citizens, states are
obligated to provide them off-reservation health care. Nevertheless, the
court cited the trust relationship as the source of this duty.96
Finally, several suits successfully alleged the Secretary of Interior
breached his trust by unlawfully terminating federal supervision over
groups of California Indians and their rancherias,97 small congressionally
created reservations established in California in the early 1900's. Termina-
tion, a now abandoned national policy prevalent in the late 1950's, in-
volved the termination of the special relationship between certain Indian
tribes and the government, and was designed to force Indian tribes to as-
similate into the mainstream of American life by making Indians ordinary
state citizens. This policy was effectuated by granting the states regulatory
jurisdiction over the affected Indian tribes, including taxing power, ending
the Indians' entitlement to federal programs, and providing for the sale of
94. Chambers, supra note 10, at 1233-34 (footnotes omitted).
95. 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978).
96. Id at 698. For a criticism of the decision as undercutting tribal sovereignty and an
argument that federal statutes could have been relied on instead of the trust relationship, see
Gonzalez & Henderson, Health Carefor Tribal Citizens. A Criticism of White v. Califano, 7
AM. IND. L. REV. 245 (1979).
97. Smith v, United States, 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (money damages and
equitable relief); Duncan v. Andrus, 517 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (equitable relief only);
Duncan v. United States, 597 F.2d 1337 (Ct. Cl. 1979), vacated and remanded, 446 U.S. 903
(1980), remand decision, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1981),petition for cert. filed 50 U.S.L.W. 3785
(U.S. Mar. 30, 1982) (No. 81-1747). In addition, one such case was decided after Mitchell.
Table Bluff Band v. Andrus, 9 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM)
3005 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1981). For a discussion of Table BluffBand and the remand opin-
ion in Duncan, see infra notes 188, 211, 282 and accompanying text.
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Indian property or other assets with the proceeds divided up among the
tribal members. Usually, though not always, tribal consent was obtained
before termination.9
8
The affected tribes were awarded equitable relief including orders de-
terminating the rancherias; 99 in addition, some plaintiffs were awarded
money damages either in the district court or the Court of Claims. "00 The
same analysis is common to each of these cases, for each involves the same
legislation and secretarial action. Duncan v. United States'" is representa-
tive of the analysis in these cases. More important, as a Court of Claims
decision, it represents the high-water mark of litigation to enforce fiduciary
duties before Mitchell.
The California Rancheria Act, the termination legislation involved in all
the cases, directed the Secretary of the Interior to construct whatever irri-
gation and sanitation systems, "including domestic and community water
supplies," the Indians and Secretary agreed the United States should com-
plete.'" 2 In Duncan, the tribe approved a distribution plan drawn up by the
Secretary containing a provision stating only that the Indians "requested"
the Bureau of Indian Affairs to provide water for certain residences. As to
sanitation, the tribe never obtained an adequate sewage system.' 0 3
The Court of Claims held the Secretary of Interior had breached his
fiduciary obligations to the tribe by terminating federal supervision with-
out installing adequate water and sanitation systems. The court held the
Secretary liable for whatever direct damages the tribe could prove flowed
from the breach."4 Although acknowledging that the parties never agreed
the Secretary would "guarantee an adequate year-round water supply,"' 05
the court, nevertheless, held the Secretary breached his trust in not provid-
ing such a supply.
98. See generaly Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 139, 148-51 (1977). Tribes in the west were particularly affected by termina-
tion, losing a great deal of their land. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N,
95TH CONG., IST SESS., FINAL REPORT 447-54 (Comm. Print 1977).
99. Compare Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56, 62 (N.D. Cal. 1978) with Duncan
v. Andrus, 517 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
100. Compare Duncan v. United States, 597 F.2d 1337, 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Tucker Act
jurisdiction); with Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (concurrent
Tucker Act jurisdiction).
101. 597 F.2d 1337 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
102. Act of Aug. 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-671, § 3(c), 72 Stat. 619, 619-20, amended by
Act of Aug. 11, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-419, 78 Stat. 390.
103. 597 F.2d at 1340.
104. Id at 1347. The court refused to award consequential damages for "personal suffer-
ing or injury to the native culture" as outside its limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Id at
1345.
105. Id at 1340.
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The court's analysis parallels that in the earlier cases. First, the court
established that a trust relationship existed from 1906 until termination.
To identify the claim as one founded upon an act of Congress and thus
within its jurisdiction, the court took pains to establish this trust relation-
ship as "statutorily created."' 6 The statute creating the rancheria system
in 1906 referred to the land as a reservation land at one point. Thus, the
court reasoned, Congress must have regarded the land as having "the same
status as reservation lands,"' 7 which are held in trust, even though the
legislation did not use the term "trust." The court bolstered this conclusion
by noting continuous administrative interpretation and a reference in the
1958 termination legislation to a "Federal trust relationship."'' 08 Second,
the court measured the scope of the government's fiduciary duties by refer-
ence to the requirements of the statute and the common law. The court
interpreted the statutory provision regarding irrigation to mean that Con-
gress intended "to provide the Indians with sufficient water systems to be-
come self-sufficient by the time of termination."'" Applying "exacting
fiduciary standards"' 1o required by the trust relationship to the Secretary's
actions, the court then determined the Secretary breached his duty by fail-
ing to disclose to the Indians adequate information concerning the sewage
problem. The court concluded "the distribution plan's agreement on water
supplies was so vague and uncertain as to breach the trustee's duty of fair
dealing," citing the Restatement of Trusts and Scott's treatise.I
In sum, all the above cases share similar tendencies. The courts found
no substantial barriers to exercise of subject matter jurisdiction or to pre-
vent a claimant from suing the government. As to the requirement of a
federal claim, both the district courts and the Court of Claims had adopted
a similar analysis: interpreting a broad statute liberally as creating a trust
relationship, the courts measured the government's fiduciary duties by
analogizing to private trust law and the growing body of decisional law in
the area of Indian trust claims. Mitchell, however, brought this process to
an abrupt halt.
106. Id at 1346.
107. Id at 1342.
108. Id at 1343.
109. Id
110. Id at 1344.
111. Id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 170 at 1298 (1967)).
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III. UNITED STATES V MITCHELL
A. Precursors
In one sense, Mitchell represented nothing new because previous deci-
sions had indicated that in a case founded on a statute, a Tucker Act
claimant needed a claim for money damages to prevail. Two of these deci-
sions figured prominently in Mitchell and thus merit closer attention. In
Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States, "2 the Court of Claims held it
had no jurisdiction over a claim for business loss damages resulting from
the Federal Maritime Commission's wrongful withholding of approval of
a sale foreign of a ship first obtained from Germany as war reparations.
Noting a series of earlier decisions had held the Commission's policy of
requiring a penalty fee before approval to be illegal," 13 the court neverthe-
less refused to give relief beyond the return of the penalty required by the
Tucker Act provision that permitted a claim for "money wrongfully with-
held."' 14 The court stressed that plaintiffs may not invoke the Tucker Act's
jurisdiction over statutory claims merely by making a claim "intimately
involv[ing]" a federal statute, but requiring recourse to some other princi-
ple of law as mandating a damage recovery. Instead, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the statutes relied on "can fairly be interpreted as man-
dating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sus-
tained." 115 The statute relied on in Eastport could not be read as creating
any sort of claim for resulting business loss because it merely authorized
the Commission to approve foreign sales of the type of vessel involved."t 6
According to the court, the statute did not differ from statutes authorizing
various federal agencies to grant licenses or permission for numerous types
of activities. To hold the government liable for business loss money dam-
ages upon wrongful delay or denial in such cases was a "giant step"'"17
calling "for a drastic extension of federal liability to all of these fields."'"18
In its discussion of Tucker Act jurisdiction, the court never mentioned
sovereign immunity and its concomitant doctrine of strict construction.
The claimants lost because their only claim was for "misfeasance in gov-
ernment"119 and neither the language of the statute, the legislative history,
112. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
113. Id at 1006 (collecting cases).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
115. 372 F.2d at 1009.
116. 46 U.S.C. § 808 (1976).
117. 372 F.2d at 1009.
118. Id at 1010.
119. See Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 280 (Ct. CI. 1981) (Nichols, J., dissent-
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nor precedent in interpreting such statutes justified a money judgment for
business loss in such a case.
The Supreme Court quoted Eastport with approval in United States v.
Testan. 2° Like the claimant in Eastport, the claimants in Testan alleged
pecuniary harm resulting from wrongful federal agency action in the ad-
ministration of a general regulatory scheme. The claimants alleged the
Civil Service Commission wrongfully denied them reclassification and
back pay retroactive to the date of denial of their applications.' 2' As in
Eastport, the claimants in Testan had a federal claim: a detailed adminis-
trative scheme for challenging a wrongful classification with the likelihood
of federal district court mandamus review.1 22 Nevertheless, as in Eastport,
the statutes relied on could not "fairly be interpreted as mandating com-
pensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."'' 23
The real importance of Testan, however, is that the Supreme Court, for
the first time, referred to the process of looking for a claim mandating
money damages as an analysis required by the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, and thus an inquiry requiring the statute in question to be strictly
construed. Refuting the notion that the Tucker Act itself waives sovereign
immunity whenever a substantive right exists, the Court stated: "there can-
not be a right to money damages without a waiver of sovereign immunity,
and we regard as unsound the argument of amici that all substantive rights
of necessity create a waiver of sovereign immunity such that money dam-
ages are available to redress their violation."' 24 Although the Court quoted
the Eastport language that implied a statute need not expressly mandate
compensation, it also quoted an earlier Supreme Court decision stating
that a waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied, but must be un-
equivocally expressed."' 25 More important, in its examination of the stat-
utes relied on by the Testan claimants, the Court looked for mandatory
language regarding back pay for one arguing wrongful failure to upgrade a
classification, thus intimating express language might be required. 2 6
As one commentator has reported, the government began to make Tes-
tan arguments in the several Indian breach of trust claims working their
ing) (Eastport a claim for "misgovernment, te., for misfeasance in the exercise of peculiarly
governmental functions").
120. 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
121. Id at 394.
122. Id at 403.
123. Id at 400 (quoting Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1009).
124. Id at 400-01.
125. Id at 399 (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
126. 424 U.S. at 399-400.
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way through the federal district courts and the Court of Claims.' 2 7 Al-
though the government was successful in the Tenth Circuit, 128 the Court of
Claims en banc rebuffed the government's attempt to dismiss Mitchell on
jurisdictional grounds.'29 The Court of Claims adopted the basic analysis
required by Testan but found the new requirements easy to meet, espe-
cially in light of the doctrine requiring liberal construction of statutes ben-
efiting Indians.
. Timber Mismanagement in Mitchell
The Quinault Tribe was not the only plaintiff in Mitchell: the tribe's
original executive order reservation had been divided into individual allot-
ments between 1905 and 1933 during the era when federal Indian policy
called for assimilating Indians into the mainstream by turning them into
farmers and ranchers. 130 Although commentators may differ on the purity
of motives inspiring this allotment policy, all agree that the administration
of the policy was a disaster. 131 For instance, the Quinault allottees received
land so densely covered with timber as to be useless for any activity other
than forestry, an industry not lending itself to profitability when carried
out by individuals owning, at most, 160 acres. 132 Furthermore, intestate
succession to allotments is governed by state law. 133 Most allottees do not
make wills; through the years many heirs claim small amounts of land. A
state court cannot order an allotment sold and the proceeds divided among
the heirs, for allotted land has been placed in trust indefinitely with the
federal government as trustee. Consequently, an original allotment of 160
acres can today be owned by several hundred heirs of the original allottee.
The multiple heirship problem makes effective use of the land by the allot-
tees themselves impossible. 134
Beginning in 1910,' Congress enacted a series of statutes authorizing
the Bureau of Indian Affairs to contract for the sale of timber on allotted
land and generally manage the day-to-day business of harvesting, selling,
127. Hughes, supra note 10, at 464-65 & n.127.
128. Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979) (concurrent Tucker Act
jurisdiction) (no statute created trust fund of judgment funds distributed by government,
therefore no jurisdiction).
129. Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300 (Ct. CI. 1979).
130. General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
131. See generally S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 95-124 (1973).
132. See Brief for Respondents at 4, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
133. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
134. See generally Williams, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-The Indian Heirship
Land Problem, 46 WASH. L. REV. 709 (1971).
135. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 8, 36 Stat. 855, 857 (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 406-407 (1976)).
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and replanting timber.'36 The Quinault Allottee Association alleged perva-
sive mismanagement of their timber resources and the trust fund derived
from those resources. Specifically, they alleged seven basic claims, includ-
ing: the government permitted clear-cutting of timber in violation of a stat-
utory provision requiring sustained yield, failed to get fair market value
for timber or for rights of way and easements it granted on Indian land,
and failed to invest Indian allottees' trust money.'
37
Like so many of the prior Indian trust cases, Mitchell presented appeal-
ing facts: some allotments were owned by more than a hundred heirs of the
original allottee; some heirs alleged they had no idea where their land was
located on the reservation. Hence allottees could not use the land them-
selves. Even if they overcame the inertia created by decades of federal con-
trol of their land and banded together to form a collective timber
enterprise, they could not sell their land or timber without government
approval. Surely it was understandable that the individual allottee, who
might receive income from his or her holding only once or twice in a life-
time, would rely justifiably on the government to manage the timber busi-
ness expertly.' 38
C. Court of Claims Decision
The Allottee's Association and the tribe filed suit for breach of trust in
1971. In 1977, after trial on some of the issues had taken place, the govern-
ment filed for a motion to dismiss, relying on Testan and the Tenth Circuit
case, Whiskers v. United States. 139 In sustaining its jurisdiction, the court
stated that here "the Indians do not rest their case on unanchored, judge-
created principles of fiduciary law but point to and rely upon specific legis-
lation as creating the trust relationship."''
The court cited Testan but adhered to its Eastport analysis: no mention
was made of sovereign immunity, the court focusing instead on whether
the Allotment Act created a claim for money damages. Although plaintiffs
had also relied on other statutes referring to the Secretary of the Interior's
duties in greater detail, such as a statute requiring forests to be managed
on a sustained yield basis, the Court of Claims stated it need look no fur-
ther than the general wording of the Allotment Act to sustain
136. 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-407 (sale of timber), 413 (collection of administrative expenses),
466 (sustained-yield management of forests) (1976).
137. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 536-37. For a detailed background of
the Mitchell litigation, see Hughes, supra note 58, at 448-51.
138. See Brief for Respondents at 4-6, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
139. 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir, 1979).
140. Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300, 1302 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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jurisdiction. '4'
The court gave two reasons for concluding the Allotment Act created a
trust relationship including the full panoply of fiduciary duties attaching to
a normal trust relationship. First, the statute expressly states: "the United
States does and will hold the land thus allotted. . . in trust for the sole use
and benefit of the Indian[s] ... ."'42 Second, the Interior Department has
in fact acted as a trustee since the passage of the Allotment Act. Having
found a duty implicit in this use of the term "trust" and in subsequent
administrative action, the court then held that the duty mandated compen-
sation because the very nature of a trust relationship requires an effective
remedy for breach. Since equitable relief would be unavailing for "damage
already done," 4 3 a money damage remedy was necessary.
In sum, the court did not see the case as presenting a sovereign immu-
nity issue. At most, it saw the case as turning on whether the tribe had a
substantive claim, an issue it readily resolved using a combination of lib-
eral statutory construction and the common law regarding fiduciaries.
D. The Supreme Court Decision
In reversing the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Mitchell'" made it clear that Testan was not merely an aberration "con-
trary to doctrines of federal jurisdiction in general, and the Tucker Act in
particular."' 45 Instead, the Court used Mitchell as a vehicle to reaffirm Tes-
tan's fundamental change in Tucker Act analysis: that the Act itself does
not waive sovereign immunity, but merely confers subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 116 Because the Court of Claims relied only on the Allotment Act, the
Supreme Court applied the Testan analysis to this statute alone, pointing
out that on remand the Court of Claims could consider the other more
specific statutes regarding the Secretary's duties.
Once the question is posed as a search for a statutory waiver of sover-
141. Id
142. Id (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
143. 591 F.2d at 1302.
144. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
145. Orme, Tucker Act Jurisdiction Over Breach of Trust Claims, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV.
855, 874.
146. 445 U.S. at 538. The Court also held that the Indian Claims Commission Act provi-
sion granting jurisdiction in the Court of Claims for Indian tribal claims accruing after 1946
was not a separate basis for jurisdiction or source of waiver. Id at 538-39 (construing 28
U.S.C. § 1505 (1976)). Instead, the court interpreted § 1505 as merely removing previous
barriers to the Indian tribal claims in the Court of Claims. See supra note 10. Thus, the
Court concluded, § 1505 gives tribes only the same access to the Court of Claims the Tucker
Act gives to individuals. 445 U.S. at 539.
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eign immunity, the doctrine of strict construction must be addressed, and a
general statute, such as the Allotment Act, has little chance of being
viewed as a waiver. The Court noted that the Allotment Act "does not
unambiguously provide that the United States has undertaken full fiduci-
ary responsibilities as to the management of allotted lands."' 47 Referring
to other provisions in the Act expressing a congressional intent that the
allottee be responsible for grazing or farming the land and to the legisla-
tive history indicating congressional concern that the unsophisticated allot-
tee might lose the land, the Court concluded the trust relationship created
by the Act was limited to the concerns of preventing alienation and provid-
ing immunity from state taxes. 4 8 That this relationship could not extend
to any duties regarding timber was especially apparent to the Court, since
at the time of the Act's passage Congress believed Indians did not have
ownership rights sufficient to permit them to treat timber on their lands as
an income-producing resource. Thus, Congress could not have intended to
assume any duties to manage timber resources it believed Indians were not
entitled to in the first place. 4 9
In Testan, the Court had stressed that the claimants had failed only in
suing for money damages-the federal district courts were still available to
redress the claim of improper classification by granting prospective relief.
In other words, the Court made it clear that the claimants had a claim;
they simply did not have a claim for money damages.' 50 In contrast, the
claimants in Mitchell lost because they had no claim at all. The statute
relied on imposed no enforceable duties to manage timber. Thus, the
Court did not have to answer the second question required by Testan:
"whether, had Congress actually intended the General Allotment Act to
impose upon the Government all fiduciary duties ordinarily placed by eq-
uity upon a trustee, the Act would constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity. 9 51
Properly viewed, Mitchell not only reaffirms Testan, but takes it further.
Testan did not construe strictly the existence of a statutory duty, but only
whether the statute creating the duty mandated money damages for a
breach. Mitchell, on the other hand, applied the strict construction ap-
proach to the question of whether a statute created any enforceable duty at
all. This approach could greatly curtail Indian breach of trust claims in
both the Court of Claims and the federal district courts.
147. 445 U.S. at 542.
148. Id. at 543.
149. Id
150. Testan, 424 U.S. at 403.
151. 445 U.S. at 542.
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IV. THE AFTERMATH OF MITCHELL
A. Mitchell's Effect on Tucker Act Claims
L The Continuing Validity of Successful Breach of Trust Claims
Litigated Before Mitchell
Which, if any, of the five successful claims for money damages for
breach of trust discussed above 152 could prevail today? This is not an idle
academic question, for most of those cases concerned issues of mismanage-
ment of land and money common to many Indian tribes. A reexamination
of these earlier precedents is thus necessary to predict the outcome of later
breach of trust claims.
One of these cases can be disposed of rather easily. Coast Indian Com-
munity' should pass the Mitchell test, because a specific statute existed,
although it was not relied on by the Court of Claims. The statute states
that: "[N]o grant of a right-of-way shall be made without the payment of
such compensation as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be
just." 4 Mitchell requires strict construction of the existence of a duty and
the remediability of a breach of a duty by money damages. Applying this
analysis, Coast Indian Community should be decided favorably; the stat-
ute's mandatory language surely creates a duty and the requirement that
the Secretary pay just compensation certainly can be interpreted as fairly
mandating compensation for the damage sustained by sale of the right-of-
way at five percent of its true value. If Coast Indian Community does not
meet the Mitchell test, it is hard to conceive of a statute that would satisfy
Mitchell, other than one explicitly stating an aggrieved party may sue in
the Court of Claims for money damages. The Supreme Court, however,
has not required an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. In Testan, the
Court rejected such an argument by implication, citing with approval a
Court of Claims case relying on a statute stating that certain officers mer-
ited "the basic pay of a rear admiral (lower half) or brigadier general, as
appropriate," but not explicitly stating that the aggrieved officer could sue
for monetary relief in the Court of Claims.' 5
Thus, a sale of a right-of-way below fair market value should be remedi-
able under the Tucker Act without having to rely on the trust relationship
itself as a source of possible duties. In the remand of Mitchell, the Court of
152. See supra notes 63-111 and accompanying text.
153. 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
154. Act of Feb. 5, 1948, ch. 45, § 3, 62 Stat. 18 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 325 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
155. 37 U.S.C. § 202(/) (1970) (construed in Selman v. United States, 498 F.2d 1354 (Ct.
Cl. 1974), cited in Testan, 424 U.S. at 402-03)).
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Claims found it had jurisdiction of the right-of-way sales involved in that
case. 156
On the other end of the spectrum opposite Coast Indian Community is
Duncan v. United States,'15 7 discussed earlier as the high-water mark of
Indian trust litigation before Mitchell. Not surprisingly, the decision in
Duncan was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Mitch-
ell."'58 On remand the Court of Claims reasserted jurisdiction over the
claim for breach of trust in terminating the tribe." 9 The remand decision
will be discussed in the next section dealing with claims decided after
Mitchell. 160
Whatever ultimately happens in Duncan and other claims based on un-
authorized terminations of California Rancherias, the effects will be lim-
ited to a relatively small number of California Indians. In contrast, the
garden variety claims involving mismanagement of land and money are
common to most tribes, and involve potentially large money judgments
against the government. On the one hand, many statutes refer fairly specif-
ically to aspects of property and fund management. Perhaps these statutes
can be interpreted as creating duties in spite of the Mitchell strict construc-
tion requirement. The major question will then shift to the second inquiry
mandated by Mitchell: can these statutes be read as contemplating a rem-
edy of monetary damages?
The Funds Cases
Many statutes govern Indian funds. Three laws figured prominently in
the two trust fund cases discussed earlier, and the Court of Claims remand
decision in Mitchell. Two laws require four percent simple interest to be
paid on certain trust funds, common to most tribes and held in the Treas-
ury, including the funds at issue in the three cases.' 6 1 Another authorizes
156. Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 273 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3963 (U.S. June 7, 1982) (No. 81-1748).
157. 597 F.2d 1337 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
158. 446 U.S. 903 (1980).
159. Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3875 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1982) (No. 81-1747).
160. See infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
161. Act of Feb. 12, 1929, ch. 178, 45 Stat. 1164, amendedby, Act of June 13, 1930, ch.
483, § 2, 46 Stat. 584 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 161(a)-(d) (1976); Act of April 1, 1880, ch. 41,
21 Stat. 70 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 161 (1976)). To simplify somewhat, at issue in Manchester
Band ofPomo Indians and Mitchell are proceeds from land, authorized to be deposited in
the Treasury under § 161, and required to earn four percent simple interest under § 161(b).
Cheyenne-Arapaho dealt with trust funds required by § 161(b) to earn four percent. See gen-
erally 1982 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 50, at 549-52 (sources of tribal
trust funds).
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the Secretary of the Interior in his discretion to deposit this trust fund
money in bank accounts or otherwise invest it in certain safe securities, if
the money can earn more than the statutory four percent interest.' 62
These laws were interpreted in Manchester Band and Cheyenne-Arapaho
as setting a mandatory floor of four percent for Indian money while per-
mitting the Secretary to obtain a higher yield. In addition, because the
funds became trust funds on deposit in the Treasury, the courts held the
ensuing trust relationship by its own force mandated the Secretary to in-
vest the money to obtain the highest secure yield.' 63 In the decision on
remand of Mitchell, the Court of Claims reaffirmed the analysis of Chey-
enne-Arapaho and allowed the plaintiffs to recover any interest that would
have been earned on the proceeds of timber sales deposited into these
funds had they been invested as the Cheyenne-Arapaho guidelines
direct. 164
This analysis may not survive Mitchell, however. In the first place, only
sections 161, and 161 (a) and (b) of title 25165 contain mandatory language.
The requirement that four percent simple interest be paid surely can be
read as mandating compensation for failure to pay the four percent on
funds actually deposited in these accounts. Thus, both duty and waiver are
present. But no statute requires the Secretary of the Interior to invest trust
money. Section 162(a) of title 25 merely authorizes the Secretary to exer-
cise his discretion. 66 Thus, section 162(a) fails the first prong of the Mitch-
ell analysis-it creates no duty to make the trust fund productive. This
analysis greatly reduces recoverable damages. Damages cannot be mea-
sured by the difference between actual interest payments made and what
the money would have earned had it been invested properly-a great dif-
ference considering today's high interest rates. Moreover, four percent in-
terest must be paid, but since compound interest is not permitted, the
interest payments can once again, as they were before the earlier funds
cases, be deposited in the Treasury in non-interest bearing accounts.' 67
162. Act of June 24, 1938, ch. 648, § 1, 52 Stat. 1037 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162(a)
(1976)).
163. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
164. 664 F.2d at 274.
165. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 161 (1976), "the United States shall pay interest . . . at the
rate per annum stipulated by treaties or prescribed by law") with §§ 161(a) & 161(b) ("shall
bear simple interest at the rate of 4 per centum per annum").
166. "The Secretary of the Interior is authorized in his discretion, and under such rules
and regulations as he may prescribe, to withdraw from the United States Treasury and to
deposit in banks. . . the common or community funds of any Indian tribe. . . held in trust
by the United States." 25 U.S.C. § 162a (1976).
167. See Cheyenne-Arapaho, 512 F.2d at 1393. This conclusion is reinforced by a deci-
sion reached in an appeal of an Indian Claims Commission funds mismanagement case
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2 Breach of Trust Cases Litigated After Mitchell- Mitchell II &
Duncan II
In Mitchell I, the Court of Claims purported to cleave to the Supreme
Court's mandate in Mitchell I, but a careful reading of the en banc opinion
reveals the court still adhered to the trust analysis it employed in its earlier
cases. 6 8 Mitchell HI interpreted the specific legislation regarding forest
management that the Supreme Court held was not properly before it in
Mitchell I. Twelve provisions were in issue,' 69 but those regarding timber
sales and sustained-yield forestry management were the most important.
Thus, this analysis will focus on the court's treatment of those provisions,
referred to as the 1910 Act.
170
Sections 406 and 407 of title 25 permit the sale of timber on "Indian
land held under a trust." In the case of an individual owner's lands, the
proceeds are "to be paid to the owner or owners or disposed of for their
benefit,"' 7 ' and, in the case of tribal allotted land, such proceeds are to be
"used for the benefit of the Indians who are members of the tribe or tribes
announced six months after Cheyenne-Arapaho. United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
518 F.2d 1309 (Ct. Cl. 1975). Mescalero Apache involved, with one exception, the same
statutes as Cheyenne-Arapaho, but the court applied the rule that interest cannot be paid on
a judgment against the United States in the absence of a fifth amendment claim, contract,
treaty, or statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1976). The Court of Claims treats this no-interest rule
as requiring a separate waiver of sovereign immunity and thus requiring strict construction,
whenever a judgment includes any amount of money that can be called interest. Since dam-
ages for failure to invest must be measured by the interest lost, the court applied the no-
interest rule. 518 F.2d at 1315. The majority did not distinguish Cheyenne-Arapaho, in which
it neither discussed nor applied the no-interest rule. The court rather candidly alluded to the
fiscal concerns behind the decision, however, stating that since millions of dollars had lain
dormant in trust funds for many years, the resulting judgment could be "astronomical." Id
at 1333. In recent years, the court has distinguished the two cases out of hand as "involv[ing]
different statutes and periods of time." Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl.
1981). The dissent in Mescalero Apache essentially distinguished the cases on the ground
that § 162(a), the one statute not in issue in Mescalero Apache meets the stringent require-
ments of the no-interest rule. 518 F.2d at 1334 n. 1 (Davis, J., dissenting). The distinction is
strained, however, because § 162(a) is phrased in discretionary language. In Mescalero
Apache a statute explicitly required all government trust funds to be invested to earn at least
five percent per annum, yet the Court of Claims majority, applying strict construction, held
the statute was inadequate. 31 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1964), construed in 518 F.2d at 1324-32. It is
hard to see how § 162(a) could survive this type of strict xeading.
168. Mitchell11, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3963 (U.S. June
7, 1982) (No. 81-1748).
169. 25 U.S.C. §§ 161(a); 162(a) (1976) (funds); id §§ 319, 323-325 (rights of way); id
§§ 349, 378 (patents to competent allottees); id §§ 406-407 (timber sales); id § 413 (deduc-
tion of administrative expense); id § 466 (sustained-yield forestry).
170. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, §§ 7-8, 36 Stat. 855, 857 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 406-407 (1976)).
171. 25 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1976).
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concerned ... ,,172 Section 466 directs the Secretary of the Interior to
regulate "the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the
principle of sustained-yield management."' 173
The Court of Claims did not begin its opinion by construing these stat-
utes strictly, as Mitchell seems to require. Rather, the court stressed at the
outset only that portion of Mitchell requiring that the legislation indicate
Congress intended to make available a remedy in money damages, point-
ing out that Mitchell did not require that "the substantive right to money
must always be explicitly stated in the substantive legislation itself."' 17 4
Next, the court reviewed the history of the federal government's pervasive
involvement in Indian forestry management, and concluded that this in-
volvement itself created a fiduciary relationship. According to the court:
[W]here the Federal government takes on or has control or super-
vision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship
normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless
Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said ex-
pressly in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other funda-
mental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary
connection. '75
The court often used this trust relationship, arising from the fact of gov-
ernment supervision and control of Indian property, to interpret the stat-
utes liberally. Although the word "trust" was not used in the 1910 Act, the
court noted, "this long-continuing doctrine of government fiduciary obli-
gation in management of Indian property was infused into the 1910 and
later statutes."' 76 These statutes had broadened the Allotment Act, accord-
ing to the court, creating "a general fiduciary obligation on the Govern-
ment in the management and operation of the forest lands with which
Interior was entrusted."' 177 If Mitchell requires strict construction on the
issue of a statutory duty, as it appears to, the Court of Claims definitely set
out on the wrong foot in its remand opinion.
Having thus finessed the troublesome question of the existence of a duty,
the court next turned to a discussion of the provisions of the 1910 Act, to
answer the "crucial question"' 78 mandated by Mitchell: whether Congress
intended that compensation be available for breach. Here, too, trust doc-
trines figured more prominently than strict statutory construction. For in-
172. Id § 407.
173. Id § 466.
174. 664 F.2d at 268.
175. Id at 270 (quoting Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
176. Id at 270.
177. Id
178. Id
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stance, section 406 and 407 refer to the proceeds being used for the benefit
of the Indians. If "actual proceeds of actual sales"' 17 9 were not either paid
over to them or placed in trust funds, one could argue the provisions, refer-
ring directly to money, could be read as both creating a duty and mandat-
ing compensation for breach. The Court of Claims went further, however,
finding that the Act, when read inpari materia and in light of later Interior
Department regulations, requires the government to obtain the greatest
revenue from the timber and thus contemplates money damages for the
difference between the actual proceeds obtained and the greatest revenue
that could have been yielded through prudent management.' 80
In sum, the court read the 1910 Act as requiring "mismanagement dam-
ages" by the following analysis: first, Congress intended to create a trust
relationship requiring Interior prudently to manage forestry resources.
Second, the 1910 Act evidenced a congressional purpose that the Indians
receive the benefit of the timber sales. Third, Congress must have intended
to allow Indians to seek a remedy'for breach of trust because the nature of
a trust at common law is that the beneficiary is entitled to compensation
for breach.' 8' Finally, the court liberally construed sections 406 and 407,
noting that the statutes did not negate the existence of a claim for compen-
sation and that the term "proceeds" must be read to include the proceeds
the Indians would have received had Interior managed the trust properly.
The court bolstered this construction by noting that without it, Indians
would have no effective remedy for the failure to get fair market value (or
any compensation at all as occurred in some instances). Nor would they
have redress for failure to make timely payments and subsequent diminu-
tion of the resulting gains owing to the nonproductivity of money paid
late.' 82
The court's interpretation of the sustained-yield provision mirrored the
above analysis. Congressional intent to impose a duty was clearer because
the legislative history indicated an intent to ensure the continued produc-
tivity of Indian forests.'8 3 But the court's analysis of the waiver issue again
relied on liberal, not strict construction, to determine that Congress must
have intended the Indians to receive the financial benefits of sustained
yield. Again, the court relied on the existence of remedies for breach of
trust at common law and the lack of other remedies for the Indians at the
179. Id at 271.
180. Id
181. Id (citing G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 862 (2d ed. 1965); 3 A,
ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205 (3d ed. 1967)).
182. Id at 271.
183. Id at 272.
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time the laws were enacted, because sovereign immunity barred equitable
suits to prevent mismanagement at that time.' 84
Judge Nichols, concurring and dissenting, charged the court with not
taking its jurisdictional limitations seriously.' 85 He dissented from that
part of the court's opinion allowing compensation for mismanagement and
breach of congressional requirements for clear cutting. Although conced-
edly the statutes created legal duties, they did not create a claim for money
damages "as a semantically separate and analytically independent propo-
sition" 186 as required by Testan. To Judge Nichols, the majority opinion's
major flaw was its assumption that once a trust relationship was estab-
lished the trust relationship could then be bootstrapped into a mandate for
compensation. Congress's function as trustee of money and property has
always been treated differently from that of a private trustee, Judge Nich-
ols pointed out. In fact, this very position as trustee has been used to justify
assertions of federal power over Indians, even against their consent. Thus,
Judge Nichols concluded, the court must be wary of resorting to "using the
mere label of trust plus a reading of Scott on Trusts to impose liability on
claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed."' 87
Two months after issuing its opinion in Mitchell II, the Court of Claims
decided that Duncan, remanded to it by the Supreme Court for reconsider-
ation of its holding that the termination of a California Rancheria without
adequate water was a breach of trust, 88 met the Supreme Court's require-
ments for jurisdiction. The statutes involved were far more general than
those in Mitchell II, however.' 89 For instance, the only provision address-
ing water and sanitation merely "directed" the Secretary to provide such
systems "as he and the Indians affected agree" were needed. 9 ° Further-
more, the Secretary had prepared a plan, agreed to by the Indians of the
Rancheria, which merely stated the Indians "request[ed]" water for certain
homes under construction.'9 ' It can be argued that the statutory language
at best creates an illusory promise, or a condition precedent to termination,
complied with when the agreement requesting water supplies was made.
184. Id at 272&n.11.
185. Id at 277-79 (Nichols, J., concurring & dissenting).
186. Id at 283.
187. Id
188. Duncan v. United States, 597 F.2d 1337 (Ct. CI. 1979), vacated and remanded, 446
U.S. 903 (1980), remand decision, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1982) (No. 81-1747).
189. Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. CI. 1981), petition for cert. filed 50
U.S.L.W. 3785 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1982) (No. 81-1747).
190. See supra note 102.
191. 597 F.2d at 1340.
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Despite the paucity of specific language regarding either trust duties or
compensation, the court did not construe the statute strictly. Instead, the
court examined the statute only from the standpoint of whether it took
anything away from the "general trust relationship" between the govern-
ment and the rancheria inhabitants. 92 In the course of its analysis, the
panel also commented on the court's en banc opinion in Mitchell 11. 193 As
a result, the approach of the Court of Claims in Indian law breach of trust
cases has apparently crystallized. Nevertheless, whether it meets with
Supreme Court approval is another matter.
In Duncan 11, Judge Davis interpreted Mitchell ! as follows: "Mitchell
I rules that, if a statute creates or recognizes the United States as general
trustee of Indian property, that legislation ordinarily founds a substantive
monetary claim for breach of that trust. .. ,,94 As in Mitchell, the court
also emphasized that the supervision of Indian property alone creates a
trust relationship, even though statutes authorizing such control do not use
the word "trust."1 95
Although its discussion of jurisdiction was new, most of the court's deci-
sion concerning the Secretary's duties merely repeated the earlier opinion
in the same case, vacated by the Supreme Court. Briefly, the court held
that a "statutorily-created" 96 trust relationship existed, looking to the stat-
utes creating the rancheria system, administrative interpretation, and ter-
mination legislation itself, referring to a "Federal trust relationship."' 97 A
new portion countered the Justice Department's argument that "a federal
trust must spell out specifically all the trust duties of the Government as
trustee."' 98 On the contrary, when the government exercises pervasive su-
pervision as it does in managing Indian property, "[a] broad-scale Con-
gressional establishment of a trust is enough."' 99 The court added,
however, that specific duties could be found in the termination legislation.
Specifically, the court read the termination legislation in light of its pur-
pose to render Indians self-sufficient and to ensure they "receive the lands,
assets, and monies to which they were legally entitled." 2" Moreover, the
court read section 3(c) of the Act, quoted above, to evidence a legislative
purpose to provide the Indians with adequate water facilities. Finally, the
192. Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d at 40.
193. Id at 40-41.
194. Id (emphasis added).
195. Id at 41-42.
196. Id at 47.
197. Id at 42.
198. Id.
199. Id at 43.
200. Id
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court found the required congressional mandate for compensation in the
nature of a trust, as it had in Mitchell. Since nothing in the statutes abro-
gated "the trustee's normal duty of monetary liability for breach,"' ' the
court held money damages appropriate.
3. Conclusion. Indian Breach of Trust Anaosi After Mitchell II and
Duncan 1H
The approach of the Court of Claims in Indian breach of trust claims
can be summarized as follows:
1. The court will determine whether a tribe and the federal government
have a trust relationship. If any legislation authorizes the Interior Depart-
ment to supervise or control Indian property and money, and if the Secre-
tary in fact does exercise pervasive authority, the court will read this
authorizing legislation as creating a general fiduciary relationship.202 Even
broadly worded statutes will suffice if actual management has taken place,
despite Mitchell.2 °3
2. Once the relationship has been established, the court then determines
what duties exist, and whether the government has breached those duties.
The duties may be found in specific legislation, 2° broad legislation read
liberally,20 5 or in the general common law of trusts. z°
3. Finally, whether compensation has been mandated is determined by
asking whether any of the statutes in question abrogate the traditional
common law remedies for breach of trust.20 7 If the statutes are silent, Con-
gress must have intended to grant a remedy.
Contrast Mitchell. The Supreme Court: (1) looked only to the particular
statute at issue to determine whether that statute created a trust relation-
ship; 08 (2) refused to construe a broad statute liberally, even when it de-
termined the statute created some sort of trust relationship, rejecting the
argument that administrative interpretation and later statutes can be used
201. Id at 44.
202. Compare Mitchell I, supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text, with Duncan II,
supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
203. Compare Mitchell II, supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text, with Duncan II,
supra note 192 and accompanying text.
204. See Mitchell I, 664 F.2d at 272-73 (rights of way).
205. See Duncan It, 667 F.2d at 43 (Rancheria Act).
206. Compare Mitchell H1, 664 F.2d at 271 (duty to compensate for breach), with Duncan
1, 597 F.2d at 1344 (duty of fair dealing), cited with approval in Duncan H1, 667 F.2d at 45.
207. In Mitchell I1, the court stated: "A trust normally entails the right to compensation
for the trustee's breach . . . and this statute does not in any way suggest otherwise." 664
F.2d at 271 (citations omitted). Cf. Duncan II, 667 F.2d at 42-43 (Rancheria Act, creating
broad-scale, unlimited trust, also set forth specific government trustee obligations).
208. See 445 U.S. at 542-46.
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to infuse an earlier statute with trust duties;2 °9 and (3) insisted that even if
specific duties existed the statute must still be read strictly to determine
whether compensation, rather than equitable relief, is appropriate.2 0
In Duncan HI, the Court of Claims said that Mitchell, "which dealt with
a quite different statute and set of facts, bears only indirectly on the pres-
ent case . ". 1 Only time will tell if the court is correct. All that can be
said is that Duncan I and Mitchell HI surely do not represent the last word
on Court of Claims jurisdiction.2 2 The body that has that last word may
be moved by the equities of these cases, in which the United States has all
of the power, but few of the duties, to mitigate its requirement of strict
construction of the statutory duty of Indian breach of trust cases. If it is not
so moved, Mitchell HI and Duncan H1 may wither under the harsh light of
the Supreme Court's Mitchell I analysis.
B. Mitchell's Effect on Claims Made Under Other Provisions of the
Tucker Act.
Although Mitchell appears to require a "semantically separate and ana-
lytically independent"' 2 3 waiver of sovereign immunity for all provisions
of the Tucker Act, it might be limited to those claims "founded. . .upon
• * .any Act of Congress. ' 214 Since one sure result of Mitchell will be the
increased use of these other provisions to redress claims for breach of trust,
a brief review of these provisions is appropriate.
L Claims Founded on the Constitution: Mismanagement and the Fifth
Amendment Taking Clause
One of the little known aspects of Navajo Tribe, the helium lease case
discussed earlier,21 ' is that despite the court's discussion of trust principles,
it ultimately held the helium lease was a property interest taken in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment taking clause. 216 Mitchell and Testan reaf-
firmed that a claim based on the fifth amendment taking clause can be
209. [d
210. Id at 540-42.
211. Duncan 11, 667 F.2d at 40.
212. Court of Claims jurisdiction will be considered by the Supreme Court in the 1982-
83 term in Mitchell HI, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3963 (U.S.
June 7, 1982) (No. 81-1748) and possibly in Duncan I, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1981),petiion
for cert. fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3785 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1982) (No. 81-1747).
213. Mitchell H, 664 F.2d at 283 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
215. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
216. 364 F.2d at 345-46.
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brought under the Tucker Act without separate waiver.2  Thus, Indianplaintiffs may seek to avoid Mitchell by characterizing their claims as fifth
amendment takings, especially in a case like Navajo Tribe, in which the
government itself benefited from the mismanagement. Significantly, the
Supreme Court implied that trust fund mismanagement could sometimes
be a violation of the just compensation clause. 2 8 The Court of Claims has
not been receptive to such an argument, however, holding in a 1966 case
that extraordinary circumstances must be present to justify ever treating a
taking of money held in trust as an act of eminent domain.219
Moreover, recovery of damages for a fifth amendment taking has long
been considered difficult in the Court of Claims, partly because of the trust
relationship. Judge Nichols's concurring and dissenting opinion in Mitchell
HI addressed the irony implicit in the relationship of breach of trust claims
to fifth amendment taking claims. The Supreme Court has adopted a stan-
dard immunizing Congress to a great extent from liability under the just
compensation clause when it serves as a trustee of Indian property. 220 Fur-
thermore, in determining whether Congress acted as a trustee in order to
apply this immunity, the Court looks not at statutory language, but at evi-
dence Congress acted in good faith.22' Thus, the test is easily satisfied, al-
though, as Judge Nichols stated, "the shrinkage of Indian property [has
been] considerable. ' 222
Perhaps all that can be said at this point is that Mitchell may persuade
the Court of Claims to overcome its traditional reluctance to find that
plaintiffs have stated a fifth amendment taking claim, a reluctance partly
explainable by the court's belief that a breach of trust remedy was readily
available to the aggrieved tribes.
217. Compare Testan, 424 U.S. at 401 with Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 540 n.2.
218. Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 540 n.2.
219. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 451, 455-56
(1966) (trust money cannot be equated with private property because U.S. holds legal title).
Accord, Hoopa Valley Tribe v. United States, 596 F.2d 435, 443-44 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The
plaintiffs were not without a remedy, however, because they recovered damages for breach
of a treaty obligation when the United States used their trust funds to pay for a survey
contrary to treaty provision. See Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. United States,
167 Ct. Cl. 405 (1964) (liability phase).
220. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 416-17 (1980). (When United States
acts as a guardian in disposing of land without tribal consent, it will not be subject to liabil-
ity for a fifth amendment taking).
221. Id.
222. Mitchell H, 664 F.2d at 283 (Nichols, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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2. Claims Founded Upon Any Express or Implied Contract with the
United States- Menominee Tribe
In Testan, the Supreme Court excepted contract actions from its waiver
analysis.223 Thus, the Tucker Act itself can be said to waive sovereign im-
munity for contractual claims. Moreover, the Court of Claims has asserted
that it has jurisdiction over implied-in-fact contracts, 224 including at least
one case involving Indian funds.22 Of course, the same act of holding
money has also been characterized as creating a trust for purposes of
claims founded upon any Act of Congress, at least when statutes existed
referring to Indian trust funds. As the Court explained in one case: "The
jurisdiction of this court over actions for money encompasses actions for
money held by the Government for Indians, whether the relationship is
called a trust. . . or a holding pursuant to an implied contract . *,226
It can be expected that tribes will rely on this Tucker Act provision to
avoid Mitchell's strict construction requirement. For instance, in an opin-
ion issued within a few months of Mitchell, trial Judge Spector of the
Court of Claims relied on the trust relationship in finding a breach of an
implied-in-fact contract requiring the federal government to manage the
Menominee Tribe's sawmill prudently, entitling the tribe to over five mil-
lion dollars in damages.22 Since the claim involved the same type of prop-
erty mismanagement at issue in Mitchell, the judge's analysis merits
further attention.
Judge Spector distinguished the case from Mitchell because the trust in-
volved, although not statutorily expressed, had "broader support," arising
as it did from "several historical sources and a long course of conduct.
2 28
223. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400 ("The respondents do not rest their claims upon a con-
tract. . . . It follows that the asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether
any federal statute can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation . (quoting
Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1009)).
224. See, e.g., Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 50 U.S.L.W. 4562 n.10
(U.S. June 1, 1982); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 448, 451 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
225. See Fields v. United States, 423 F.2d 380, 383 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (dictum) (jurisdiction
based on express or implied contract). Fields is doubtful precedent, however, because the
court did not reach the merits, but instead dismissed because state courts had been vested
with exclusive jurisdiction over suits regarding heirship to allotted Indian lands. See id at
384.
226. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. United States, 596 F.2d 435, 444 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (government
did not breach trust in assuring Hoopa tribe that they were sole beneficiaries of revenues
when a later suit by excluded tribe resulted in government being forced to pay some of the
fund to the excluded tribe, in light of government's vigorous defense of Hoopa Tribe's rights
and fact that government belief that Hoopa tribe was entitled to the money was not
insubstantial).
227. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 7 INDIAN L. REP. 5093 (Ct. Cl. Aug. 14, 1980).
228. Id at 5094-95.
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Reviewing the pervasive control the government has exercised by manag-
ing the tribe's assets for 107 years, the trial judge concluded ample evi-
dence existed "that the parties had a tacit but clear understanding of their
fiduciary relationship,""' 9 giving rise to contractual damages measured by
the loss of profits due to mismanagement.
Although analytically appealing as an end-run around Mitchell, the rea-
soning of the case is quite extraordinary. There is no evidence that Con-
gress intended federal officials managing trust property from the turn of
the century until recent years to be treated as common law fiduciaries. In
fact, the evidence is exactly contrary. The trust was a source of power over
Indian lands, derived from a duty to manage lands for the Indians because
of their perceived helplessness, but certainly not also obligating officials to
manage Indian resources as if they were non-Indian businesses.23° Or, as a
contracts professor might say, this was not a bargain relationship with a
contemplated exchange of values, but a gratuitous relationship. Prompted
by only arguably noble motives, the government aided the Indian tribes;
but as in so many promises motivated by moral obligation, the promisor
either did not feel obligated to carry out his promise or, at best, did not feel
obligated to do a very good job of it.
If there is a contract in mismanagement cases, surely it is implied in law,
imposed by the courts to do justice in a given case. Certainly the one-sided
federal-Indian relationship, with such great power on the side of the gov-
229. Id at 5095.
230. See supra cases cited in notes 7-9. Although many allotment-era Supreme Court
cases speak in terms of an almost unreviewable plenary power of Congress over Indians, the
author has not been able to find one such case imposing trust duties. For a comprehensive
examination of 67 federal cases regarding guardianship of Indian lands, see Carter, Race &
Power Politics as Aspects of Federal Guardianshr over American Indians.- Land Related Cases,
1887-1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 197 (1976). Nevertheless, a 1919 case is often cited. Lane
v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919) (injunctive relief granted to prevent Secretary
from sale of Pueblo land). At least one commentator regards Lane as the leading Supreme
Court precedent permitting an equitable action for enforcement of the trust relationship.
Chambers, supra note 10, at 1230-32. On the contrary, the Court did not hold the attempted
involuntary transfer breached any federal trust responsibility to the tribe. Rather, the Court
held that the lower court's ex parte permanent injunction was inappropriate, and remanded
with directions to the lower court to enter a temporary restraining order pendente lite and
permit the government to answer the tribe's allegations. 249 U.S. at 114. In this posture, the
Court merely stated that if the transfer was unauthorized by Congress or a treaty, the tribe
had a right as a property owner to block the sale. Id at 113. As to the trust relationship, the
Court assumed arguendo that the tribe was a ward of the government, but stated the rela-
tionship "has no real bearing on the point we are considering" because the relationship
would not permit the Secretary to confiscate land under these circumstances. Id Cf. Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (Tribe may not enjoin Congress from involuntary
transfer of tribal land). For a discussion of Lone Wolf, see United States v. Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. 371, 410-15 (1980).
[Vol. 31:635
Federal-Indian Trust
ernment, should be persuasive reason for imposing the duty of a trustee on
the government. Nevertheless, the Court of Claims is without jurisdiction
over constructive contracts, for they are not true contracts, but quasi-con-
tracts.23' Moreover, the Supreme Court recently applied the Testan analy-
sis to a claim based on an implied in fact contract, in Army andAir Force
Exchange Service v. Sheehan.232 An Army and Air Force Exchange Serv-
ice (AAFES) employee argued that even if he did not have a formal em-
ployment contract with the exchange, the AAFES's own internal
regulations "created an implied in fact contract that the Service would ad-
here to those regulations while the respondent remained in employ-
ment. ' 233 In reversing the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court held that
the court erred in inferring an implied in fact contract from personnel reg-
ulations, because those regulations did not "explicitly authorize damage
awards. ' 234 The decision was prompted by the Court's view that the claim-
ant, who had essentially the same type of claim as the claimants in Testan,
had attempted to "escape the force of Testan' '235 and to subvert a provi-
sion of the Back Pay Act expressly excepting AAFES employees from its
236provisions. No statute expressly denies Indian tribes the right to recover
for breach of trust; thus, Sheehan can be distinguished on this ground
alone. Nevertheless, the Court's perception that the claimant was making
an end-run around Testan influenced its decision. A similar attempt to
avoid Mitchell might meet a similar fate. Otherwise, Indian tribes could
merely rephrase their claims for breach of trust as implied in fact contract
claims, arguing the same statutes regarded as insufficient to meet the
Mitchell test, for a claim based on a statute can be read as creating an
implied in fact contract. At the least, Sheehan casts doubt on the analysis
in Menominee Tribe.
In conclusion, the contracts analysis may not succeed. While it is possi-
ble that the Supreme Court is willing to view the Indian tribes' original
relinquishment of sovereignty and land as a bargained-for-exchange in re-
turn for the perpetual services of the federal government in managing their
231. See, e.g., Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1925). In Mitchell 11, the
court rejected the contracts claim, because there was no evidence that the government had
ever entered into an agreement to manage the timber properly. 664 F.2d at 275. The court
nevertheless stated that the plaintiffs could amend their petitions on remand if they had such
evidence. Id at 275-76.
232. 50 U.S.L.W. 4562 (U.S. June 1, 1982).
233. Id at 4565.
234. Id at 4566.
235. Id at 4565.
236. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c)(1) (1976, Supp. IV).
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resources,237 this analysis appears unlikely to emanate from the Court. In-
stead, the Court itself has continually referred to the process of acquiring
authority over Indians and Indian lands as one of conquest238-a far cry
from a bargain relationship.
3. Claims for Liquidated and Unliquidated Damages in Cases Not
Sounding in Tort
The provision of the Tucker Act providing Court of Claims jurisdiction
over claims for liquidated and unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort may seem to fit the breach of trust situation perfectly. When the
breach of trust is not negligent and thus not a tort,239 a claimant using this
provision could avoid both the strict statutory construction of Mitchell and
the strained contracts analysis of Menominee Tribe. The Court of Claims,
however, has deliberately shied away from this provision, calling it "that
still-amorphous and unfamiliar part of our jurisdiction .... ,240 Never-
theless, if the Supreme Court disagrees with the lower court's analysis of
the statutes in MitchelII, the Court of Claims may be forced to shape that
provision into a remedy.
4. Conclusion
Other Tucker Act provisions may provide a vehicle for breach of trust
claims, as sketched above. Still, it is hard to believe the Supreme Court's
major concern was with the analysis by which the Court of Claims had
been concluding the government was liable, rather than with the conclu-
sion itself. In other words, the underlying value in Mitchell may well be the
desire to protect the government-forced by circumstances into the role of
manager of Indian land and money-from damages for mismanagement
of property such as the timber in Mitchell and the sawmill in Menominee
Tribe, and money, such as the trust funds in Cheyenne-Arapaho. One rea-
son would be to protect the public fisc from payment of large damage
awards, which has often been a covert and overt concern in Indian law
cases. 241 A second reason would be that because the government gets none
237. For an eloquent argument in favor of viewing the entire federal tribal relationship
as a contractual one, see R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES
& POLITICAL LIBERTY (1979).
238. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955) (aborig-
inal Indian property is not property within the meaning of the fifth amendment taking
clause because United States acquired title to all Indian land by conquest). See generally
Carter, supra note 230.
239. See supra note 40.
240. Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1013 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
241. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290-91 (1955) (con-
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of the benefits available to the private trustee, it should incur fewer duties,
and then only those duties specifically mandated by statute. In light of
these considerations, the Court could reason that availability of equitable
remedies to prevent future breaches of trust is an acceptable trade-off for
the loss of a damage remedy. Here too, Mitchell's impact has been felt.
Some district courts have begun to limit the trust relationship by requiring
statutory creation and delineation of the scope of the relationship and by
reading the statutes strictly, citing Mitchell for authority.242 The next por-
tion of this article will examine Mitchell's effect on claims for equitable
relief in the district courts. Though few in number, the cases may represent
a trend having serious consequences upon the ability of Indian tribes to
enforce the trust relationship.
C. Mitchell's Effect on Claims for Equitable Relief
The dissenting justices in Mitchell pointed out that the elimination of a
money damages remedy destroys a powerful deterrent to mismanagement
of Indian resources.24 3 Yet the loss of a money damages remedy still leaves
the possibility of equitable relief, desirable both to preserve trust property
and money and to maximize its productivity. Preservation and maximiza-
tion of existing resources is crucial for tribes attempting to strengthen their
political autonomy and authority, for territory to govern and funds for
government are essential.244 Arguably, Mitchell will even strengthen a
tribe's ability to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief, for with breach of
trust claims limited, there is no adequate remedy at law and thus no bar to
equitable relief.24
In suits for equitable relief, a few courts have required that trust rela-
tionship duties be stated expressly in a treaty, statute, or agreement,246 but
trary rule could lead to United States liability in the billions of dollars); Cherokee Nation v.
United States, 270 U.S. 476, 492 (1926) (awarding compound interest might exceed the na-
tional debt); United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309, 1333 (Ct. Cl.) (Al-
though such concerns do "not govern the outcome of this suit," a contrary rule could expose
the government to liability in an astronomical amount), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1975).
242. See, e.g., infra cases cited in note 246.
243. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan & Stevens,
JJ.).
244. Chambers, supra note 10, at 1235-36.
245. See generally D. DOBBs, REMEDIES 27 (1973) (equitable remedy granted only when
there is no adequate remedy at law). Furthermore, jurisdiction under the APA is premised
explicitly on the absence of an adequate remedy at law. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
246. See, e.g., Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 784, 799 (D. Alaska 1978);
Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (trust relationship standing
alone is insufficient to give rise to a claim; interference with present occupancy or breach of
statutory requirements is necessary before court will order United States to create a reserva-
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these cases usually involved tribes that had been terminated by positive
congressional action.247 For the most part, however, district courts have
held the trust relationship to be a source of enforceable duties, or at least to
require that relevant statutes be read liberally to create such duties, usually
accepting the existence of such a relationship without question.248 For ex-
ample, in a case decided after Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit read a general
statute granting authority over Indian health care as affirming "the princi-
ple that our government has an overriding duty of fairness when dealing
with Indians, one founded upon a relationship of trust. .... "249 The court
thus held that the Indian Health Service "breached its statutory duty" in
allocating California Indians, who comprise 10% of the Indian population,
an average of only 1.18% of its funds. 25° The court distinguished Mitchell
on two grounds. First, the court pointed out that its holding was based on
statutes and not "the general trust relationship."25' Second, because the
plaintiff did not seek money damages, the Mitchell "jurisdictional di-
lemma" did not attach.
252
The court's reasoning is apposite. Mitchell's requirement of strict con-
struction was governed by rules of interpretation regarding waivers of sov-
ereign immunity; in suits for equitable relief invoking the Administrative
Procedure Act, no waiver issue is present. Thus, although liberal rules of
construction of statutes benefitting Indians arguably must give way in the
Mitchell context, when they conflict with strict rules favoring the govern-
ment, 25 liberal rules of construction favoring Indians can and should be
tion out of national forest lands wrongfully taken from tribe). See also Skokomish Indian
Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1959) (trust relationship alone does not create
consent to be sued, because trust relationship can only be found in treaty).
247. See, e.g., Cape Fox Corp., 456 F. Supp. at 799 (Native Claims Settlement Act specif-
ically disavows trusteeship over Alaskan Natives); Donahue, 363 F. Supp. at 1321-23 (action
brought by unrecognized, landless tribe of California Indians).
248. See supra notes 67-73, 85-101 and accompanying text.
249. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Harris, 618 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1980) (em-
phasis omitted) (quoting Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1974)).
250. Id at 571, 575.
251. Id. at 575 n.8. Cf. No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 373 (W.D. Wash. 1981)
(the law does not recognize a generalized trust relationship; motion for summary judgment
denied and case set for trial on whether specific treaty duties had been breached by pipeline
project).
252. 618 F.2d at 575 n.8.
253. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552-54 (1981) (presumption
against conveyance of title to rivers to entities other than states defeated Indian tribe's claim
that reservation of land for tribe in treaty included river); United States v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309, 1323 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1975) (strict con-
struction necessitated by rule barring interest on money judgments against United States
defeats tribal claim to damages for mismanaged trust funds measured by amount of interest
the funds would have earned had they been managed correctly).
[Vol. 31:635
Federal-Indian Trust
applied when there is no conffict with an established rule of strict
construction.
Nevertheless, two cases in the District of Columbia Circuit have applied
Mitchell in suits seeking equitable relief. Although the decision in each
case is probably justifiable apart from Mitchell, continued reliance on strict
construction could have a devastating effect on Indian attempts to bring
about prudent management of their dwindling resources.
In Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block,254 the district court refused to order an
existing ski resort torn down or enjoin its expansion. The ski resort was
located in an area acknowledged to be an important traditional religious
site for both the Hopi and Navaho people. The plaintiffs had argued that
the American Indian Religous Freedom Act 215 created a trust relationship
obligating the government to "protect and preserve Indian religious free-
dom to believe, express, and exercise traditional religions. ' 256 In contrast,
the court interpretated the legislative history as indicating only a policy
requiring governmental agencies to consider the impact of actions on reli-
gious sites and not to deny freedom of worship.25 7 Since the plaintiffs still
had access to the religious site, the statute was satisfied. The court relied on
Mitchell in reaching this conclusion, pointing out that although the Allot-
ment Act, interpreted in Mitchell, contained much more explicit language
than the Religious Freedom Act, the Mitchell court refused to construe it
as placing full fiduciary obligations on the government.258
Arguably, Hopi Indian Tribe does no violence to the values protected by
earlier district court trust relationship cases. As the court itself pointed out,
there is ample authority for a court to refuse to impose enforceable duties
on the government outside the realm of protection of Indian land, money,
and entitlement to programs.25 9 In addition, the Religious Freedom Act is
in fact a general statement of policy, not amenable even to liberal interpre-
tation as imposing an enforceable duty to prevent any further development
of Indian religious sites that does not interfere with Indian access to the
sites or exercise of religion.26" Nevertheless, although the court probably
254. 8 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM 3073 (D.D.C. 1981).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. 1II 1979).
256. 8 INDIAN L. REP. at 3076.
257. Id
258. Id at 3077,
259. Id. at 3076.
260. The Act states:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the tradi-
tional religions. . . including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession
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could have reached the same conclusion, its reliance on Mitchell was mis-
placed and could be misleading.
C. Accommodating Competing Interests Within Federal Departments.-
Pyramid Lake & North Slope Borough
Pyramid Lake,26' discussed earlier, was also a product of the District of
Columbia district court and is the purest example of the use of a so-called
"general trust relationship," not tied to statutes, treaties, or regulations. In
Pyramid Lake, the court imposed a duty on the Secretary of the Interior
not to balance away Indian interests in attempting to accommodate other
interests within his jurisdiction. In effect, the court held the Secretary had a
duty to do his utmost within the constraints of existing law, to preserve a
valuable tribal resource. It has been argued that equitable relief is particu-
larly appropriate "to accommodate the conflicts between Indian trustee re-
sponsibilities and competing government projects that affect countless
federal agencies. 262 Yet a recent decision from the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals followed Mitchell in holding the Secretary of Interior's
action in approving oil leases proposed by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment did not violate any general fiduciary duty to Indians.
To understand this conclusion, the case, North Slope Borough v. An-
drus,263 must be examined in greater detail. North Slope Borough was a
broad-scale attack by environmentalist groups and the Inupiat Eskimo
Tribe against off-shore leasing in the Arctic's Beaufort Sea. The principle
concern of the plaintiffs was the preservation of the bowhead whale. The
plaintiffs based their claims on several federal environmental laws, but
were unsuccessful in preventing the leases from being executed. The court
held that the Secretary had complied with all the environmental laws, at
least at the leasing stage. 2 4
The Alaskan natives' claim that the Secretary had breached his trust
responsibility met a similar fate. The court first noted that the Inupiat's
concerns were linked with the environment, because they hunted the bow-
head whale.265 The court then held the natives' concerns were adequately
protected by the Endangered Species Act, which the court held the Secre-
of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites.
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. III 1979)).
261. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
262. Chambers, supra note 10, at 1236.
263. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
264. Id at 598.
265. Id at 593.
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tary had satisfied.2 66 Next, the court cited Mitchell for the proposition that
the trust responsibility can be found only in statutes,267 which must be
strictly construed. The plaintiffs argued that the numerous exemptions
from environmental laws for natives who hunted for subsistence purposes
created a duty to protect the subsistence hunting life-style of natives.268
The court rejected this argument, stating that "[wlithout an unambiguous
provision by Congress that clearly outlines a federal trust responsibility,
courts must appreciate that whatever fiduciary obligation otherwise exists,
it is a limited one only.",2
69
Concededly the court went on to evaluate the Secretary's actions in light
of his trust responsibility, "such as it is."'2 70 Thus, the court did not dismiss
the natives' claim to a trust relationship out of hand, despite the strong
language just quoted. The most troubling aspect of North Slope Borough,
however, is that the court acknowledged the Secretary's discretion to bal-
ance the competing interests in these cases without giving an "overriding
veto" to the claims of the Natives.27' According to the court: "Each bal-
ance involves tension and compromise of dual values that are disap-
pointing in some degree. The tension implicit in the Secretary's required
actions-whether by statute or otherwise-cannot be transformed into a
veto for any one particular set of interests which would halt the Secretary's
delegated decision-making. 272
Contrast Pyramid Lake. In that case the Secretary had argued he was
forced by the need to balance competing interests to make a "judgment
call" sacrificing the tribe's interests in preserving water for its tribal lake to
the Bureau of Reclamation's interests. Judge Gesell rejected this argument,
stating:
A 'judgment call' was simply not legally permissible. The Secre-
tary's duty was not to determine a basis for allocating water be-
tween the District and the Tribe in a manner that hopefully
everyone could live with for the year ahead. . . .The burden
rested on the Secretary to justify any diversion of water from the
tribe with precision. It was not his function to attempt an
accommodation.273
Nevertheless, a Mitchell analysis was not necessary to reach a conclusion
266. Id at 611.
267. Id
268. See id at 611-12.
269. Id
270. Id.
271. Id. at 613.
272. Id
273. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1973).
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adverse to the Natives, for several reasons. First, no present threat existed.
The court's opinion discussed at length the limited effect of the leasing
state of this massive project, particularly stressing that no drilling could be
authorized until tests were undertaken by the lessees resulting in a compre-
hensive plan on the feasibility of the projects. Only if the lease stage was
implemented could the Secretary accurately predict the effect on the
evironment.274 Furthermore, there was no evidence the limited physical
intrusions made during the two-year leasing phase would affect the bow-
head whale population. Second, Indian property was involved in Pyramid
Lake, but not in North Slope Borough. Many courts, including the Court
of Claims, have been reluctant to extend the trust relationship to include a
duty to protect a tribe's autonomy or actual identity, regardless of the gov-
ernment's culpability.275 The Inupiat Tribe does not own the bowhead
whale; it merely claimed that hunting the whale was a necessary part of its
people's subsistence culture. The court could have distinguished the case
on this ground alone. Third, as the court noted, 76 Congress has termi-
nated the trust relationship with Alaskan natives in the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).z77 One of the expressed purposes of
ANCSA was to set up a system different from that in the lower forty-eight
states.278 Accordingly, the ANCSA model requires the Natives to set up
their own corporations and manage all their own affairs.2 79 In light of such
clear legislative intent not to have a trust relationship with the Alaskan
natives, a court properly should require any asserted trust relationship to
be indicated clearly by statute. Other cases before Mitchell involving Alas-
kan Natives denied relief on these very grounds.280
D. Equitable Relief after Mitchell
Although two cases do not usually represent a groundswell, two cases
274. 642 F.2d at 593-94.
275. See Chambers, supra note 10, at 1242-46.
276. 642 F.2d at 612 n.151.
277. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
278. Congress's findings in the Act state in part: "[Tihe settlement should be accom-
plished rapidly. . . without establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights,
privileges, or obligations, [and] without creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or
trusteeship. ... 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1976).
279. For a description of the Act, see Price, A Moment in History.- The Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, 8 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 89 (1979).
280. See, e.g., Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 784, 800 (D. Alaska 1978).
Cf. Carlo v. Gustafson, 512 F. Supp. 833 (D. Alaska 1981) (Native Townsite Act passed for
the benefit of individual Natives obtaining townsites under its provision; court has jurisdic-
tion to determine whether government breached). Jurisdiction in Carlo was premised on
§ 345. See supra note 38.
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from such a prestigious circuit might have great influence. As stated above,
neither case involved protection of Indian land and money or entitlement
to government services given Indians generally.28' The successful breach
of trust cases before Mitchell all involved these sorts of claims. At the same
time, district courts had refused to grant equitable relief for claims involv-
ing the protection of Indian sovereignty or cultural identity before Mitch-
ell. Although this earlier narrowing of the trust relationship had not been
without its critics,282 it appeared to be settled law by the time of Mitchell.
Thus, the analysis in Hopi Tribe and North Slope Borough relates to this
earlier narrowing and can be distinguished solely on this ground.
On the other hand, if district courts follow Mitchell the consequences
could be serious. The successful cases discussed earlier often involved stat-
utes granting the Secretary authority to manage property or money but not
mandating the exercise of that authority. For instance, recall that the dis-
trict court in Manchester Band awarded equitable relief in the form of an
order to invest tribal trust funds prudently, as well as money damages.283
Yet, when that case was submitted to a Mitchell analysis the conclusion
was that strict construction might permit only a holding that the tribes
were entitled to a mandatory four percent simple interest.284 If equitable
relief were similarly limited, a tribe would be faced with the choice of de-
manding the right to take charge of its own investments or settling for
being able to enforce only the four percent mandated by statute. Similarly,
the plaintiffs in Duncan successfully obtained equitable relief in the district
court before their money damage claim was transferred to the Court of
Claims. The district court declared the rancheria "de-terminated" and or-
dered the defendants to rectify the water and sanitation problem.285 If the
Mitchell analysis were applied to such a case, the Indians in the terminated
rancheria would have no remedy, as a federal district court for the North-
ern District of California recently concluded in dismissing a concurrent
Tucker Act claim for breach of trust in termination of another California
281. White v. Calfano and Rincon Band v. Harris are the clearest examples of this latter
category. See supra notes 96-97, 247-50 and accompanying text. Usually these cases can be
decided on narrower grounds because they involve analysis of legislation and administrative
regulations. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (BIA benefits extended to Indians
living near reservation because regulations excluding them were not properly promulgated)
(jurisdiction under the APA). In such cases, the trust relationship functions more like "a sort
of broad 'fairness doctrine' rather than a more precise doctrine that can be used to enforce
particular rights." Chambers, supra note 10, at 1246.
282. See supra note 271.
283. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
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rancheria.286
The remaining cases awarding equitable relief discussed earlier, White v.
Calf/ano287 and Edwardsen v. Morton ,288 would meet a similar fate, for
neither case involved statutory authorization much less a statutory man-
date. On the contrary, in each case relief was granted, or at least contem-
plated, despite federal authorization for the action taken, because of a
conflict with a federal trust relationship neither court felt impelled to
anchor in federal statutes.
Mitchell, however, need not spell the end of the trust relationship as a
doctrine enforceable against the federal government. The Tucker Act re-
quirement of a claim based on a statute forces courts exercising Tucker Act
jurisdiction to focus on statutes creating enforceable duties, applying the
strict construction analysis mandated by Testan and Mitchell. On the other
hand, the federal district courts have no such constraints. Of course, a stat-
ute creating a claim is helpful, though not necessary, for federal subject
matter jurisdiction,2 9 but the statutes relied on can be liberally construed
both for jurisdictional purposes290 and for purposes of awarding relief.
Furthermore, claims based on the APA need no further waiver of sover-
eign immunity. 291 Thus, when cases involving mismanagement of property
of money, or entitlement to federal services arise, district courts should
follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit, distinguish Mitchell, and call the gov-
ernment to account for any abuses.
V. CONCLUSION
Before Mitchell, courts were satisfied with a fairly loose analysis in
breach of trust claims. For the most part, they assumed the existence of the
relationship, unless a particular tribe clearly had been terminated by fed-
eral statute. Moreover, they often measured duties imposed by the rela-
tionship by common law more than by federal statutes, treaties or
regulations. Mitchell has forced a change in this procedure in claims for
286. Table Bluff Band v. Andrus, 9 INDIAN L. REP. 3005 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1981).
287. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) ("§ 1331 jurisdiction
will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of statutory origin").
290. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Non-
intercourse Act and federal policy of protecting Indian land sufficient to make claim against
third parties for trespass one arising under federal law for purposes of federal question juris-
diction): Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1381 (D.D.C. 1973) (ANCSA and pre-
Settlement Act duty to protect land sufficient for federal question jurisdiction; presumption
in favor of judicial review).
291. See supra note 42.
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money damages. At a minimum, general statutes putting land or money in
trust will not suffice to create enforceable obligations unless the legislative
history clearly so indicates. Unfortunately, since the trust reationship was
considered only as a source of federal power during most of this Nation's
history, such evidence is lacking. But Mitchell can be carried further, as
this article demonstrates. For even if a statute delineates a duty with suffi-
cient specificity to meet the requirements of Mitchell, the law or legislative
history must also indicate Congress contemplated money damages as a
remedy. Moreover, the Court's emphasis on specificity of the duty in
Mitchell may inspire courts to narrow the trust relationship to become a
creature wholly of statutory law, even though Mitchell is not a precedent
when equitable relief is sought.
If the trust relationship does become a creature of statutory law, its effi-
cacy as a legal theory will be greatly hampered, especially if these statutes
are read strictly. Although many statutes govern Indian affairs, they usu-
ally grant authority to the federal government or state federal policy re-
garding Indians. Rarely do they impose enforceable obligations.
Nevertheless, this judicial narrowing of the enforceability of the trust
relationship may have salutory effects. Unenforceable federal mismanage-
ment may rally tribes to organize and supervise their own resources. If
tribes do take over supervision at their own request, their revenues could
292increase. A second and related benefit is that such tribes may then be-
come stronger political units, and this political strength may, in turn, cause
them to assert their tribal sovereignty in place of federal dependency. A
third benefit, also related, is that tribal advocates may search for other
theories to protect Indian land and money, instead of relying on the trust
relationship with its patronizing, colonial overtones. For instance, tribes
may rely with increasing sophistication on the APA, or on theories based
on inherent tribal sovereignty. As an example, the Jicarilla Tribe has im-
posed a severance tax on oil and gas at the well-head,29 3 and may now use
the ensuing revenue to fund its own management program, necessary be-
cause its oil and gas resources were badly mismanaged by the government
in the past.294 Other tribes similarly may impose business taxes on lessees
292. See LINOWES, supra note 64, at 120-21. See also Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal
Nationalism and Its Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 UNIV. COLO. L. REV.
617, 642-47 (1976).
293. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982) (tribe's inherent sover-
eignty permits imposition of severance tax on non-Indian oil and gas lessees; tax does not
violate negative implications of commerce clause).
294. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp, 479 F. Supp. 536, 547-51
(D.N.M. 1979). In Supron Energy Corp., the court held that the Secretary of Interior
breached fiduciary duties by: (1) failing to see that oil and gas lessees diligently developed
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and other users of Indian property for this purpose. Finally, tribes may
rely increasingly on constitutional arguments. The trust relationship starts
from the proposition that the federal government has plenary power over
Indian tribes.295 Instead of conceding this point,29 6 tribes might begin both
to challenge this practically unlimited power of Congress to run Indian
affairs and to assert individual rights barriers to limit federal power.
Although this argument paints a rosy picture of Indian tribal autonomy,
it must be remembered that many tribes, like the Quinault allottees in
Mitchell and the rancheria inhabitants in Duncan, lack the sophistication
or the political coherence to manage their own property. Moreover, most
tribes, including the larger and more powerful ones, believe they need the
federal government to protect them from outsiders, especially from the
surrounding states.297 Yet the federal government, whom they have em-
braced as the lesser of two evils, has abused its power over Indian tribes.
When federal power is abused, tribes have looked to the federal courts
for protection. Moreover, the relatively recent activist response of the fed-
eral courts to Indian breach of trust claims seems particularly appropriate,
in light of the history of the place of Indian tribes in the federal scheme
and the resulting political powerlessness of Indian tribes. Courts should be
zealous to protect Indian tribal rights, because Indian tribes represent only
one half of one percent of the population, maintain separate cultures even
at the end of the twentieth century, exercise inherent governmental pow-
ers, but have none of the rights accorded states by the Constitution, and,
except for the well-organized and wealthy energy resources tribes, have
very little lobbying power. Yet before the recent Indian law revolution,
courts had been far more zealous to protect federal power. Furthermore,
this tender solicitude continues today. The same year it handed down
Mitchell the Supreme Court decided United States v. Sioux Nation.298 The
Court reaffirmed that Congress's trust relationship may shield it from fifth
amendment liability when it takes Indian property without tribal consent
if it does so as a guardian "transmut[ing] land into money" rather than as a
sovereign exercising eminent domain.2 99 Moreover, the Court relied on
wells as required by lease; (2) failing to ensure protection of leased lands from drainage; and
(3) failing to ensure the method used for computation of royalties was the method most
likely to produce the highest royalties.
295. See supra cases cited in notes 7-9.
296. See 1982 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 50, at 217-20.
297. See, I American Indian Policy Rev. Comm'n Final Report, supra note 98, at 447-56.
Seegenerall,, OUR BROTHERS KEEPER 5-23 (E. Calm & D. Hearne, eds. 1969); Wilkinson &
Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977).
298. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
299. Id at 409. See also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). (Indian tribal
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"unanchored, judge-created principles of fiduciary law" 3" instead of spe-
cific language in statutes in adopting this standard.
In the final analysis, it is this two-faced role of the federal government
that made the earlier breach of trust cases so appealing to the lower courts.
As the Supreme Court noted in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway: "It
is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to
act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to
exercise the power in their interest and behalf ... ."I"o If the trust rela-
tionship is a shield for the federal government, so should it be a sword for
Indian tribes. Yet Mitchell has blunted that sword considerably. In conclu-
sion, Mitchell was wrong. The Court should take the opportunity to limit
its effect when Mitchell II and Duncan H1 come before it, and whatever the
result, the federal district courts should not perpetuate it in suits seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Despite the mixed feelings of Indian
tribes about the federal government, any mention of the concept of termi-
nation of the trust relationship sends shock waves through Indian commu-
nities.30 If a new termination era is to begin, it should be for Congress and
not the courts to inaugurate.
assertion of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-Indian land within the reservation is
inconsistent with their dependent status).
300. The government had characterized the plaintiffs claim in Mitchell in this fashion.
See Mitchell, 591 F.2d at 1302.
301. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
302. See supra note 98.
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